For many Americans, technology appears to be the answer to winning the country’s next big war. Formidable displays of force by Russia and China, combined with concerns about falling behind enemy capabilities, have led the United States to adopt a technology-first policy, believing this will increase its chances of victory and deter conflict. We are moving toward an offset strategy. Unfortunately, this thinking has only resulted in funding projects that have no purpose. It ignores a fundamental truth about what wins wars: doctrine and the evolution of doctrine. The claim that technology alone causes changes in the nature and character of war cannot withstand scrutiny. On the contrary, technology acts as a power multiplier and an enforcer of doctrine. Technology is only as effective as doctrine allows it to be. If America forgets this fact and prioritizes technology-driven doctrine over doctrine-driven technology, it risks losing the next major war, even when faced with a technologically inferior opponent. To prepare for future battles, the United States must prioritize doctrine, not technology.
Planning like 1989
Seeking to secure a Revolutionary Military Action (RMA) to counter developments in Russia and China, the US military is developing certain capabilities under the Third Offset Strategy, including weapons such as hypersonic missiles, drones, and AI. Priority has been given to creation. This approach, at least in the eyes of offset strategy proponents, means that the United States has systematically used technology to outperform its adversaries’ perceived advantages. However, while the United States has achieved offsets against past adversaries, such offsets have arisen from the clever use of technology as a means of force multiplication within a larger doctrinal framework. Regardless of the type of technology, its effectiveness is always measured by its ability to implement its strategies and principles. Effective implementation of the doctrine, based on the technology developed to implement the doctrine, can serve as a more important deterrent than nuclear weapons and convince an adversary that the strategy cannot be adopted.
Perhaps the most prominent historical example of this comes from the Cold War. At the time, NATO faced the Soviet Union’s overwhelming numbers and capable military technology and had to evolve its plans to win a conventional war in Europe. In the 1970s, NATO observed Israel’s successful use of mobile warfare doctrine combined with technology during the Yom Kippur War and introduced the AirLand Battle Doctrine, which emphasized early offensive action with rapid retaliatory strikes and breakthrough tactics. did. AirLand Battle replaced the Active Defense Doctrine, which viewed conflicts in Europe as being defensive in nature and deemphasizing offensive maneuver actions. The requirements of AirLand Battle led directly to the development of the F-117 Nighthawk, AH-64 Apache, M1 Abrams, and many other weapons, including precision-guided weapons that dominated conflicts throughout the 1990s and beyond. These weapons had no meaning under the Confederacy’s previous doctrine. Only within AirLand Battle did the need for such technology arise. Through a combination of doctrine and technology, NATO achieved a force-building advantage over the Soviet Union.
lessons from the past
Conversely, pursuing a technology-driven offset strategy without considering doctrinal implications could have dire consequences for a nation’s military. Imperial Japan’s adoption of this idea in World War II provides a harsh lesson in the dangers of combining superior technology with erroneous doctrinal formulas. At the beginning of World War II, Japan’s six aircraft carriers formed the core of its naval power. Developed as a way to offset America’s superior battleship strength, Japan planned to use its highly advanced aircraft carrier fleet to dominate the Pacific Ocean. However, despite the advanced capabilities of its ships, Japan’s naval strategy remained rooted in outdated concepts that valued decisive battles over flexibility. This approach met with disaster at Midway in 1942. Reluctant to attack the newly discovered U.S. Navy aircraft carriers immediately, the Japanese leadership insisted on rearming half of the available carrier-based planes in order to carry out a large-scale unified attack in accordance with Japanese naval doctrine. did. This delay allowed the U.S. military, acting on adaptive and innovative carrier attack tactics, to strike first, resulting in the loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers and the end of Japan’s leadership in the Pacific War.
Avoid America’s Midway
The United States cannot afford a Midway moment in the next great power war. To ensure a chance of victory, the United States must critically examine and refine its current doctrine, analyze what the future battlespace will look like, and develop requirements based on that analysis. be. Simply emphasizing the multi-domain nature of future conflicts is insufficient to adequately address what wars are like and how the United States should fight them. be. Offset technology may be useful, but only in the right framework with location and new uses.
Embracing newly evolved warfighting concepts integrated with cross-domain ideas such as littoral air power is perhaps the most important aspect of future military doctrine. Past developments have determined the reality of future wars. Weapons range has increased, defense capabilities have expanded, and the flashpoints for potential U.S. engagement with Russia and China are well established. Eastern Europe and the South China Sea both present unique challenges. In Europe, the line between airspace and land is becoming blurred due to the rise of unconventional warfare using unmanned aircraft. Today, the majority of conflicts involve airspace accessible to drones, known as coastal airspace, challenging traditional notions of air superiority and requiring enhanced electronic and air warfare. Denial tactics. In Asia, vast seas and land masses alike require long-range missiles and hard-hitting aircraft. China is already aware of this and has developed an area denial strategy that uses some of the most advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons ever developed, an example of a force buildup. . The United States must reflect this through long-range, distributed force employment programs. Only after America establishes a new doctrine based on these operational environments can the development of third-offset technologies be justified, but this alone will not win the next war. Achieved through the right blend of technology and doctrine, modern RMA provides winning answers and increases the likelihood of victory in future great power wars.
