On January 27th, President Trump signed an executive order to establish the “American Iron Dome.” The directive requires that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegses submit plans for the Next Generation Missile Defense Shield within 60 days, allowing the president to review it before finalizing the 2026 budget.
Now is the best time to rethink the possibility of using space-based interceptors to destroy missiles at the most vulnerable boost stage. As space becomes a recognized domain of military operations, resistance to deploying defensive weapons into space is declining. Especially when such systems help to promote crisis stability and enhance security. Furthermore, the deployment of double-used rendezvous spacecraft by the US, China, Russia and other countries effectively transforms space into weaponized territory. Furthermore, launch costs have become a key factor in the cost of establishing missile defense systems in space, but SWOPE and Karako’s recent SpaceNews Op-Ed have been brought to low Earth orbit from $30,000 per kilogram in 1989 It said that the launch costs have dropped significantly. It would be $1,500 per kilogram in 2018, and forecasts suggest it could drop to around $500 per kilogram in the near future.
Specifically, the executive order will provide information including updated assessments of strategic missile threats from ballistics, highsonics, cruises, and other advanced aerial attacks targeting homeland. I’m working on it. Recognition that spatial-based sensors and interceptors are necessary to target missiles during the boost phase. A review of theatre missile defense capabilities to identify opportunities for international cooperation. Reference architecture and implementation plan for the American iron dome. And financial planning.
Instead of leaving it to partisan arguments, this order requires constructive discussion at both the classified and uncategorized levels to maximize its potential. Unlike general combat debates, which are often ruthless, merciless and constructive arguments, they are characterized by respectful communication, evidence-based arguments, and a true willingness to consider different perspectives. Its aim is to promote mutual understanding, identify common foundations, and generate potential solutions. Importantly, this process should not prevent critics from opposing initiative funding, if they choose.
Missile defense has been a priority for the US president ever since President Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. More than $250 billion was allocated to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) program from 1985 to 2023. Of the current US missile defense system, launched by the presidents of both parties, and was often bipartisan support. Given this common history, the cross-pollination of their experiences and ideas is a timely and cost-effective missile defense that can protect the United States from enemies, even those with the advantage of choosing when and where to strike. This could lead to system development.
New risks in space
However, constructive discussion and meaningful exchanges should include people who provide new perspectives on how they become space and how national security can be strengthened, both in space and on Earth. It needs to be expanded. And the space domain, and the capabilities of the various countries there are changing. For example, in 2022, China successfully docked on a non-responsive, dead Chinese satellite in geographical orbit, just two years after the US, in order to achieve a similar feat. This double-use rendezvous spacecraft can dock and serve friendly satellites, allowing you to easily disable enemy satellites. In this way, space is effectively weaponized.
But both China and Russia continue to argue that no one should place weapons in space – even defensive things like space-based interceptors that Trump recognizes as necessary for missile defense. .
Their double-use rendezvous spaceships are not weapons, and agreeing with our fellow enemies that even defensive weapons should not be deployed in space can prove miserable It has sex. China is claimed to be able to develop and deploy up to 200 rendezvous spacecraft as anti-health weapons in the coming years, disabling 100 important satellites to support both military and civilian operations It may be. Utilizing this surprising attack as a precursor, followed by a massive invasion across the Chinese Channel, would greatly increase the chances of capturing Taiwan. Therefore, we must embrace analysts’ insights and space-based missile defense and interception systems that can provide strategies to protect our critical satellites.
Reaction to the executive order
As expected, the response to the order is largely following the partisan line. Liberal media often cite experts who claim that unlike Israeli iron domes, the vast size of America and the high cost of such systems, it is unrealistic and cost-reducing. . Furthermore, critics argue that key elements of missile defense systems can be quickly or preemptively destroyed by peer enemies at much lower costs. Meanwhile, conservative outlets tend to support the initiative, citing positive comments from Trump and Heggs.
Unfortunately, both parties are likely to dig into the heels, with little room for cooperation. The future of the program relies on legislative votes for appropriate funds, with potentially few swing votes determining their fate. Even if Trump pushes the program well, a future Democrat president can cancel it. If your budget fails, precious time – potentially up to four years – can be wasted.
Rather than further deepen the partisan disparities, Hegses needs to quickly establish an open, independent strategic council to function as an impartial soundboard for MDA leadership. This council should ensure that constructive discussion is at the heart of all working groups. It also needs to provide feedback on proposed strategies, provide challenge assumptions, and present alternative perspectives. By providing valuable external perspectives, we support leadership in making informed decisions. The council must set the tone by holding meetings that promote respectful and evidence-based discussions by having diverse members from governments, think tanks and independent analysts. there is. This council, together with all working groups, must remain as is until the missile defense system is fully implemented and operational, regardless of how many years it takes.
Additionally, the council should help promote constructive discussion by raising questions that the working group should consider. The key questions that stimulate this discussion through the initiative can start with four:
Which trajectory is vulnerable? : One potential reason for missile defense failures is lack of funds. Missile defense agencies must work with other agencies and the Space Forces to increase visibility and fund the programs that support missile defense efforts. For example, Space Force prioritizes protecting satellite constellations in low Earth orbits, but may overlook people in higher orbits, such as semi-synchronized, global, or very elliptical, especially during this dropout. There is. While all high-orbit satellites are as unimportant as satellites used for missile defense tasks such as sensing, tracking, and intercepting, they are still essential for functions such as communication, imaging, navigation, and weather. The missile defense community should raise concerns about satellite vulnerabilities in higher orbits in space and provide assistance in ensuring funding. It is also important that the working group explores cost-cutting measures across the initiative. Space-based interceptors: Should we develop and test space-based segments of missile defense systems during the phase? Should the first phase focus on the limited number of launches from Rogue States and the ability to intercept accidental or rogue launchers? Once this feature has been verified, it can be expanded to address threats from peers or countries nearby. Crisis Stability: What measures can be taken inside or outside the missile defense system, increase the stability of the missile defense system’s crisis and prevent escalation of tensions in times of conflict and uncertainty? Best alternatives with cost/benefit analysis: What alternative designs and implementations should be considered for missile defense systems? You should use effective cost/benefit methodology to select the best alternative.
Trump’s assumption of missile defense systems could likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and these costs could arise when developed through trial and error, a risk inherent in the trial and error process. . To prevent unnecessary spending, we must work together to design and implement missile defense systems that are timely, cost-effective and secure crisis stability.
Brian Chow is an independent policy analyst with a doctorate. In physics, distinguished MBA, doctoral finance, and over 180 publications.
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