Report
February 7th, 2025 • 3:24pm
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Toplines: The US and its allies must be ready to stop two-sided wars and nuclear attacks in East Asia
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Conflicts with either China or North Korea are a significant risk to US national security, especially due to the possibility of simultaneous and nuclear escalations involving both countries, due to coordination with US alliances and partners. brings. Therefore, US defense and military leaders will ensure that they will prepare and win the potential conflict in East Asia, with limited nuclear attacks or even one that includes multiple enemies at the same time. The efforts need to be expanded. It expanded multilateral military contributions and influenced mid-level actors within enemy military structures, allowing for the deterrence of subregimes.
It’s worth a thousand words
East Asia geography is an important potential variable that increases both the probability and impact of conflict with the US, and is concurrent with both, especially given the increased range of modern sensors and weapons systems. It expands into conflict.
Geographical considerations for Northeast Asia in the US-PRC conflict
diagnosis
The risks of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or North Korea, particularly the possibility of simultaneous escalation involving both, pose a serious threat to the United States and its interests. This threat is enhanced by the possibility of one of the enemies relying on limited nuclear attacks.
The two-song war in Asia could unfold without close cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang. Adjusting or misunderstanding of dysfunction can easily lead to conflict. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear war in East Asia is increasing as both China and North Korea are developing greater incentives and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks.
Deep-rooted organizational and cognitive biases hamper the United States and its allies’ ability to predict simultaneous conflicts between China and North Korea. Such biases also hinder preparations to manage such escalations and counter limited nuclear attacks.
The capabilities of the US and Alliance, command and control arrangements, and military stance are currently inappropriate to provide a robust military response in the case of two-sided wars and/or limited nuclear wars in East Asia. Simultaneous conflicts with both enemies will place serious operational and strategic challenges on the employment of the United States and its allies and/or nuclear weapons.
Prescription
If the US’s conflict with one East Asian enemy does not end immediately, it could expand.
The US and its allies re-released plans for attacks by either the PRC or North Korea as marking the start of an Indo-Pacific campaign that requires the prevention and potential defeat of other potential enemies. It needs to be conceptualized. The US and South Korea should shift their focus to broader priorities, not just protecting South Korea from attacks that force them to strengthen deterrence from PRC attacks, as well as North Korea. The US government and non-governmental agencies need to sponsor research and war on potential conditions and drivers that could escalate the US PRC conflict through Taiwan to the Korean Peninsula.
The risk of war in East Asia becoming nuclear is increasing as both China and North Korea increase the incentives and capabilities for limited nuclear attacks.
The US defense community must direct and sponsor analysis and research by the US intelligence agency and external analytical entities. . In cooperation with allies, the United States must improve and amplify declarative policies to emphasize that the United States and its allies will not be split by limited nuclear attacks. This should include contextualizing the repeated US declaration that “there is no scenario in which the Kim (family) administration can survive by adopting nuclear weapons.” In partnership with US allies and partners, US military planners strive to ensure they are prepared for battle and victory in the face of limited nuclear attacks and to clearly communicate this preparation to their enemies and allies. You need to enlarge. Maintaining a variety of military response options other than nuclear retaliation also requires setting the stage to avoid the impression that responses other than immediate nuclear counterattacks indicate weakness or hesitation. The US should lead international interagency efforts to investigate and prepare options to mitigate, mitigate and block risks from China or North Korea. Classified levels. This analysis includes the scope and disadvantages of potential options for increasing preparation and adoption of US tactical nuclear weapons in response to limited nuclear attacks, if the situation seeks it. You should include evaluations of pros and cons. Reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into the region or the South Korean Peninsula itself.
The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are currently not well defined to combat two wars and/or limited nuclear wars in East Asia. The PRC’s capabilities and ability to do so have grown, and it may soon be positioned to compete with the US and allies on multiple fronts in the neighborhood.
The US comprehensively covers East Asian command and control (C2) relationships and attitudes in the context of evolving North Korea, China, and nuclear threats to identify appropriate C2 relationships in the event of a simultaneous conflict. Reevaluation should be undertaken by North Korea and China, and, if necessary, have the best C2 arrangements and forced attitudes for theatrical level tactical nuclear reactions. In addition to robust nuclear de-nuclear selection, US defense and military planners ensure that the US has an effective, timely and reliable option for limited nuclear attacks in order to respond to limited nuclear attacks. It must be. While related nuclear capabilities must be resourced, trained, staffed, equipped and supported, the message is gaping in US capabilities that could be exploited through limited nuclear attacks. This can dispel awareness among enemies and friends. The US defense community has increased the presence of relevant experts forward and has led to major US allies (particularly South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) due to conflicts with the PRC and/or North Korea, including limited nuclear weapons. You should help to operate and prepare intellectually by attacks by either or both.
However, in the event of a dispute, the US has the option to manage escalations.
The relevant US military commands should apply and operate a larger focus, focusing on in-conflict deterrence rather than general conflict deterrence. The US and its allies seek more multilateral (Australia, Canada, or the UK) revolving contributions of aircraft and maritime patrols, and move to a movement to strengthen international commitments and contributions to detering attacks by North Korea and the PRC. You should seek involvement. The US government has announced that it will “have a “restraint strategy” within the PRC and North Korea as part of its US deterrence strategy to delay or prevent implementation of Esclory, including targeted impacts on mid-level stakeholders. Sub-specialists must pursue research, development and implementation of approaches that pursue “deterrence of sub-specialists” movements, particularly limited nuclear attacks.
We understand that the biases of the US and alliances can escalate how conflicts in East Asia can and are prepared to manage such escalations.
Analysts in the US and Alliance should not only develop new assessments of the potential and potential indicators of a simultaneous conflict between the PRC and North Korea, but also carry out limited nuclear attacks by Beijing or Pyongyang. These need to use structured analytical techniques such as key assumption checks to identify and overcome bias. The US and alliance leaders must simultaneously establish guidance that there is a risk of conflict between the PRC and North Korea, and in either case, military planning and exercises must consider and address these possibilities. It has the important meaning that there is. Baseline. The US and alliances need to establish working groups to reduce various military commands to deal with simultaneous conflicts and limited nuclear attack preparations. US policymakers and analysts are now able to ensure that alliance counterparts are involved in the possibility of simultaneous conflict and hostile nuclear attacks by repeatedly including these possibilities in the scenarios of movement and dialogue agenda. You need to lead the efforts to do so.
Although a version of this report was originally written for the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), it does not necessarily represent the views of DTRA or other US government organizations. The principal investigators thank the DTRA, particularly the Strategic Trends team, for sponsorship, guidance, support and resources for this study.
Markus Garlauskas is director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at Scowcroft Sentor for Strategy and Security and a former senior US government official. He also leads the Council on War and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific Tiger Project. He was appointed Senior National Intelligence Service as North Korea’s National Intelligence Officer (NIO) from 2014 to 2020. This led to a strategic analysis of the US intelligence agency regarding South Korea. Garrauskas also served for 12 years at the headquarters of the United Nations. This served as a combined military commander and US South Korean forces in Seoul, including the estimated chief and the head of the Intelligence News Department of Strategic Affairs.
The Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council effort, is developing new insights and practical recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to thwart and counter attacks in the Indo-Pacific. Explore a collection of works, including expert commentary on local strategic defense and deterrence issues, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis.
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