
Posted: September 25, 2024
Author: Anant Venkatesh, Bangalore
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) remains one of the most influential actors in determining Iran’s political stability and foreign policy, as well as the broader security situation in the Middle East. Ananth Venkatesh analyzes the sources of funding for the Revolutionary Guards to understand how this impacts the organization’s objectives and capabilities, and how these funds are sustainable in the medium to long term I’m doing it.
Important points
Intelligence Questions: What are the sources of funding for the Revolutionary Guards and how sustainable are they in the medium to long term? Importance: What are the Revolutionary Guards’ military capabilities, responsibilities, overseas deployments, and their impact on the country’s elections and foreign policy? Influence is overshadowing Iran’s traditional regime. military since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Assessments and outlooks that will remain important factors in determining Iran’s political stability and Middle East security situation in 2024: janes Due to the lack of diverse data sources, we have moderate confidence that the IRGC’s funding sources are unlikely to be significantly weakened by internal or external contingencies or medium- to long-term political considerations as of 2024. I have it and evaluate it.
introduction
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) was established as a separate branch of the Iranian Armed Forces by order of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini after the May 5, 1979 Iranian revolution.
Mirroring Iran’s regular armed forces (Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA), and Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)), the IRGC is further divided into the IRGC Aerospace Forces (IRGCAF), IRGC Ground Forces (IRGCGF), and IRGC Naval Forces (IRGCN). The IRGC has two other divisions. One is the Basij, a paramilitary volunteer militia, and the other is the IRGC-Quds Force, which serves to advance Iran’s strategic objectives abroad, including through collaboration with non-state armed groups (NSAGs). IRGC-QF). ).
Unlike Iran’s conventional armed forces, whose more traditional military role is concerned with maintaining the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Revolutionary Guards is primarily concerned with ensuring the survival of the political system specifically established after the revolution. is the mission. This is evidenced in Article 2 of the Constitution of the Revolutionary Guards, which states that the Corps is tasked with combating “factors and trends aimed at the destruction and overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran or actions opposed to the Islamic Revolution of Iran.” It is stipulated that they will be responsible.
The Revolutionary Guards also have significant influence over Iran’s foreign policy making, elections, and economy through the patronage networks they command. Financially, the Revolutionary Guards consistently receive higher budget allocations from Tehran compared to Iran’s conventional armed forces (see below), resulting in a one-third of its total personnel of 418,000. Despite comprising less than 1,000 yen, it is far better equipped in terms of core assets. According to Janes data, IRIAF, IRIA, IRIN.
As of 2024, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are among the countries that have designated the Revolutionary Guards as a “terrorist” organization. As a result, the Revolutionary Guards’ access to international markets has been restricted by several rounds of sanctions due to their activities, which were deemed to be destabilizing, particularly in the Middle East.
On the 21st, armed soldiers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps attract attention as they march in a military parade commemorating the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) held in front of the Khomeini Shrine in southern Tehran, Iran. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. September 2024. (Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
funding source
According to a December 2020 report in Iran Wire, a UK-based media outlet, Iran’s 2021-22 budget allocates approximately $2.3 billion to the Revolutionary Guards, which are “designated for national defense purposes. This accounts for approximately one-third of all funds.” The report added that the amount was “nearly three times the budget allocated to Iran’s conventional military.”
Jane’s defense budget data largely confirms this estimate, stating that Tehran allocates a portion of its annual defense budget to the Revolutionary Guards, increasing from 27% in 2013 to 37.3% in 2023. are.
Other open source estimates for Iran’s annual budget allocation to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards range from $2 billion, according to a December 2020 report by Iran Primer, a website affiliated with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). , according to one report, ranges from about $7 billion. June 2020 report by Eurasia Group, a private company based in the United States.
Unlike Iran’s conventional military, the Revolutionary Guards regularly receive additional funding from Tehran during times of heightened tensions with adversaries. For example, in January 2020, following the assassination of QF commander QF Soleimani by the United States, the Iranian government announced that it had ordered the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of its “countermeasures against the United States,” according to a report released in the same month. It provided approximately $225 million. Operates Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA).
Mr. Janes said that the military and non-military capabilities of the Revolutionary Guards are almost certainly augmented by such budgetary allocations from Tehran, as well as by several other sources, including illegal ones. It is evaluated that it is shown in the following. These additional sources are divided into those that come from within Iran and those that involve other states and/or foreign non-state actors.
domestic source
Qatam Al Anbiya
One of the main ways the IRGC generates revenue domestically is through the activities of commercial entities that act as fronts. The most powerful of these organizations is Khatam al-Anbiya, an IRGC-affiliated engineering company founded in 1979 that manages the country’s agriculture, industry, hydrocarbons, health, real estate, mining, pharmaceuticals, road construction, and education. , responsible for projects in the transportation sector. .
According to the 2009 publication “The Rise of Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Role of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps” published by the Rand Corporation, Khatam al-Anbiya and/or its subsidiaries are responsible for the construction of the Tehran-Tabriz railway line. I’ve been doing it. Among other projects, we have implemented projects such as the Karke Dam in Khuzestan and the 900 km natural gas pipeline from Asaluyeh in Bushehr province to Iranshahr province in Sistan and Balochistan province. Additionally, Khatam al-Anbiya is also responsible for the operation of Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The Tehran-based Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA) reported in September 2024 that Khatam al-Anbiya is also responsible for the construction of several oil and gas refineries in Iran and the development of the South Pars gas field in the Gulf. .
Since 2010, US Treasury reports have estimated that the annual value of contracts awarded by Tehran to Khatam al-Anbiya is worth tens of billions of dollars. According to a June 2019 press release from the U.S. Treasury Department, this included contracts for “10 projects in the oil and petrochemical industry worth $22 billion, four times the official budget of the Revolutionary Guards.” It is said that there is.
Bonyaz
Bonyads, or subnational Iranian foundations engaged in philanthropic activities, also constitute a second important pillar of the Revolutionary Guards’ non-budgetary domestic funding sources.
Similar to Khatam al-Anbiya, some of its charitable foundations, such as Bonyad Mostazafan and Bonyad Shaheed va Omru-e-Jambazan, are affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, and are said to be affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. The company operates more than 500 subsidiaries in the industry. , according to a 2018 report in London-based media Arab Weekly.
Other sources of domestic income
Although less well-documented, several international media outlets, including a 2015 report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), say the IRGC is involved in a wide range of crimes from trading in scrap metal, extorting local businesses, and controlling major international borders. He also receives income. intersections and checkpoints.
IRGC funding sources in 2024. (Jane’s)
IRGC’s funding source is foreign
According to a 2009 publication by the Rand Corporation, Khatam al-Anbiya and the Revolutionary Guards affiliate Bonyaz expanded their operations in the late 1990s, operating livestock farms in the “Middle East,” as well as building railroads and roads. , has pursued residential construction contracts. , Europe, Africa, South Asia, and even Russia and other former Soviet Union countries. For example, in 2004, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) awarded a $30 million contract to a subsidiary of Bonyad Mostazafan to build a 37-kilometre road in the eastern Hajar Mountains.
Apart from front company activities, the Revolutionary Guards are also directly engaged in the smuggling of alcohol, drugs, weapons, tobacco, etc. into and out of Iran, and subsequent trade. A 2021 report by a website affiliated with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a coalition of political groups opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran, found that such trade offers the Revolutionary Guards profit margins of 200% to 300%. It is estimated that it will bring about Annual revenue could be as high as $12 billion. Janes is unable to independently verify such estimates through open source intelligence.
According to multiple U.S. Treasury Department notices, most recently published on September 17, 2024, this trade is often made possible by individuals, commercial entities, and banks based in Iran’s neighboring countries, such as Iraq and Turkiye. The company is said to have generated profits worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Providing “income from the sale of Iranian goods” to both state and non-state actors. This includes the sale of goods, particularly weapons, to members of the Iranian-allied Axis of Resistance, including Syria, Hamas, Iranian-allied Iraqi militias, Ansar Allah, and Hezbollah. A September 17, 2024 U.S. Treasury Department notice states that these networks operate a “shadow banking” system that allows Iran to “provide access to the international financial system and obfuscate transactions with foreign customers.” It added that it was configured.
UK-based blockchain analysis firm Elliptic said in an August 2023 report that the IRGC is also increasingly turning to crypto transactions to circumvent international sanctions and receive payments. In fact, an October 2020 report from Radio France Internationale (RFI) stated that the Central Bank of Iran has created guidelines governing the mining and exchange of cryptocurrencies for import and export purposes.
Additionally, the Revolutionary Guard’s illegal sales of Iranian oil and gas are carried out using “black fleets” of tankers, including “ship-to-ship transfer operations” and “middlemen, hidden money transfers.” , petroleum rebranding, etc.” According to a May 2024 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) article, they hide their Iranian origins and appear to come from a third country. Again, Iranian oil and gas is heavily subsidized, so the Revolutionary Guards almost certainly enjoy very high profit margins.
analysis
Janes’s analysis of the sources of funding for the Revolutionary Guards and its development since the 1979 Iranian revolution, discussed above, highlights the significant expansion in types and revenues generated by them.
Domestically, the IRGC has been highly successful in “coopting financial elites into its group of subsidiaries and subcontractors,” according to a 2016 report on the NCRI-affiliated website. This almost certainly included taking over the patronage networks that existed in Iran in 1979 under the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the then-current military. It is very likely that the IRGC subsequently replicated these patronage networks in other sectors of the economy in order to strengthen its financial power.
However, Janes said that the main expansion of the Revolutionary Guards’ funding took place in the international arena, given that Iran’s foreign policy underwent a major reorientation with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. , I evaluate it with a certain degree of confidence. Although the exact distribution of revenue generated by the IRGC’s domestic and foreign sources remains unclear, Janes assesses with low confidence that the latter accounts for a significant portion of the IRGC’s funding. are. Given the vast number of sources of income and Tehran’s global network of shadow banks, this is how much it will spend in 2024:
For more information, please read our insight report: Sources and medium- to long-term sustainability of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ financial empire