Geopolitics Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 50 Issue 4
Author: Giuliano Bifolchi
executive summary
Saifieddin Tajbayev’s appointment to a senior position in Syria’s Ministry of Defense highlights serious security risks to Tajikistan and Central Asia. This development could facilitate the movement of more militants from Central Asia to Syria and encourage the establishment of new foreign fighter networks and training centers.
These fighters, equipped and trained under the new Syrian Defense Organization, could eventually return to their home countries and seek to destabilize local governments.
The report analyzes the implications of Tajbayev’s role, focusing on the risks it poses to stability in Syria, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
Important points
Saifieddin Tajbayev’s appointment could encourage Central Asian militants to travel to Syria to establish or join new training centers or terrorist organizations. Trained and equipped fighters returning from Syria are increasing the threat of destabilization in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries. Tajbayev’s presence in Syria symbolizes the growing ties between foreign extremist leaderships and Central Asian extremist networks.
Saifieddin Tajbayev of Syria:
information context
On January 3, 2025, Tajik bloggers close to Hayat Tahir al-Shams said that Saifiddin Tajibayev has been appointed as the new commander of Kaid Amariat Filivo, the head of the operational headquarters of the emerging Syria. posted on its social media page. Ministry of Defence, Government.
Tajbayev is a former commander of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and has a history of recruiting Tajikistan nationals to extremist activities. His appointment reflects the Syrian Transitional Government’s strategic efforts to incorporate experienced foreign fighters into its defense structure, with six of its 50 senior defense personnel reportedly being non-Syrian. It is said that they are being assigned to human combatants. The decision raises concerns about the militarization and legitimization of extremist leaders within state institutions.
Tajikistan’s internal security challenges, including political repression, ethnic alienation, and economic instability, make it a breeding ground for extremist ideology. Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) remains vulnerable, with the marginalization of ethnic minorities fueling resentment and increasing susceptibility to radicalization. Tajikistan’s government has long struggled to counter the claims of groups such as Islamic State. Islamic State’s propaganda efforts also include publications in local languages, such as the recently published Tajik version of “Voices of Khorasan.”
Tajbayev’s leadership could draw more Central Asian militants to Syria, increasing instability in the region. These extremists could establish training centers and foreign fighter networks, enabling them to further expand their terrorist activities. After repatriation, these individuals pose a potential threat to government stability, a phenomenon also observed in past conflicts.
Given the volatile geopolitical situation in Central Asia and the Middle East, marked by the aftermath of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan leading to the resurgence of the Taliban, Tajbayev’s actions The impact extends beyond Syria’s borders. and could facilitate future jihadist propaganda.
risk scenario
Tajikistan and Central Asia
Impact of returning fighters: Central Asian fighters returning from Syria are using their combat experience to build covert support networks inside Tajikistan, complicating law enforcement operations and providing logistical or financial support to militant groups. may provide support. Propaganda and Recruitment: Ideological radicalization through propaganda glorifying foreign fighters in Central Asia could lead to increased recruitment and sympathizers, intensifying security challenges across the region. Transnational threats: Tajikistan’s proximity to Afghanistan facilitates cross-border movement and enables cooperation between militant groups in Afghanistan and Central Asia, allowing them to share resources and expertise to strengthen their operations. There is a possibility. Exploitation of local grievances: Particularly in areas like GBAOs, returned militants can exploit socio-economic grievances to galvanize local support for insurgent activities and further destabilize the region. . Regional implications: Combatants may target vulnerabilities in neighboring states, promoting regionalization of operations. This could increase dependence on external powers for security and undermine regional sovereignty and cohesion. Opportunities for cooperation: As a counterbalance, Central Asian states could respond by strengthening regional cooperation on counterterrorism and promoting stronger security integration and resilience to common threats.
Syria
Inclusion of foreign fighters: The transitional government’s incorporation of foreign fighters and jihadist members into the defense apparatus raises questions about their loyalties and intentions, putting them at risk of internal division and instability. There is. Challenges to Government Credibility: The presence of individuals affiliated with extremist groups risks undermining the transitional government’s international credibility, complicating diplomatic efforts, and reducing global support. Conflict within the military: If these combatants pursue personal or ideological goals, they can lead to conflict within military ranks, weakening the chain of command and hampering stabilization efforts. Resurgence of terrorism: Internal divisions and instability within the Syrian military could foster an environment ripe for a resurgence of terrorism, thereby endangering regional and global security. Diplomatic complications: Foreign fighters could challenge the government’s direction and legitimacy and impede Ahmad al-Shara’s attempts to foster dialogue with actors such as Turkey and Russia.
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