In January, The Diplomat’s monthly magazine, which I have managed for over a decade, will once again feature a full-cast cover story outlining what to expect from this year’s authors. In this masterpiece of essays, we do not try to predict the future, but rather to draw the reader’s attention to what we see at the dawn of the new year. In a sense, it’s a wasted exercise. All of us, journalists and analysts, academics and commentators alike, are rooted in the present and (hopefully) deeply rooted in the past. But we don’t know the future. Only a madman or a prophet would tell you different.
As we approach the final days of 2024, I would like to take this opportunity once again to reflect on my efforts looking ahead.
How did you do it?
inside me 2024 outlook vignette I begin by directing readers to Kyrgyzstan and discussing the many things that could (but ultimately did not) derail President Sadyr Japarov’s 2024 term, from energy shortages to the breakdown of negotiations with Tajikistan. An overview of black swans. I concluded that “there is no shortage of pinch points here for those in power in Bishkek,” and that this reality has pushed Japarov and his government partner Kamchibek Tashiyev to extremes, forcing the government to It concluded that it had the potential to thwart all kinds of revolutionary agitation. “It is exploiting the country’s advantageous geopolitical position between Russia and China to further pressure political opponents and the media and avoid criticism from the West.”
The black swan never appeared. In fact, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ended the year with an apparent border agreement. But anyway, the Kyrgyz government acted more or less as expected.
In 2024, Kyrgyz authorities maintained a ban on protests in prime locations such as the capital, and indeed put pressure on political opponents and the media, including the January arrest of more than a dozen journalists associated with Temirov Live. This started and continued throughout the year. . Both men are well-versed in Kyrgyzstan’s history and penchant for revolutionary regime change, and have worked hard to fend off potential threats with a heavy dose of populism and a decisive response. But a flock of black swans is always looming.
Next, I noted the increasing tempo of chatter about various roads, routes, and corridors across Central Asia throughout 2023, and inferred that this would always continue until 2024. What progress has been made remains paired with uncertainty; The Corridor is still a big hit.. Let’s take the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway as an example. In May, Japarov said Construction was scheduled to begin in October. Over the summer, the Chinese government promised to finance half of the project, giving it new life. Construction reportedly began on December 27thafter three governments signed the investment agreement for the project. There continues to be talk about the Intermediate Corridor. Even as the war in Ukraine continues, the impetus behind this vision remains.
Finally, in the wake of the diplomatic whirlwind of 2023, I suggested that we may or may not maintain that pace next year. I admit that I wrote this with a bit of risk aversion. However, diplomacy is cumulative. Records aren’t broken every year, but relationships evolve over time, and we saw that throughout the year. Central Asian countries continue to overcome difficult geopolitical situations, due in no small part to their relationships with the region’s large neighbors, China and Russia, and with Western countries. Of course, this challenge brings risks, but it also brings opportunities.
As expected, the region has had a quiet year as the United States has been embroiled in domestic political drama and other geopolitical hotspots. The west side continued to impose sanctions New organizations were established in the region to assist Russia, but their targets were diplomatically sensitive. China’s Xi Jinping doesn’t travel as much as he used to, but I headed to Astana for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in July. He then stopped in Tajikistan for a state visit. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the region four times in 2024. Uzbekistan in MayKazakhstan in July and November (for the SCO and later CSTO summits, respectively), and Turkmenistan in October.
If 2023 was a diplomatic whirlwind, 2024 has seen some dust settle. But it settled down more like a lull before a hurricane than the calm after a storm. As we hurtle towards 2025, the winds are shifting again.
For next year, check out the January 2024 issue of The Diplomat Magazine.
