As Europe enters a new political cycle, the EU faces immense geopolitical and economic challenges in a multipolar world.
A new political cycle for the EU after the European Parliament elections in June 2024 will begin with the inauguration of the second President von der Leyen, the appointment of Antonio Costa as President of the European Council, and the appointment of the Polish government under President Donald Tusk. It begins. As the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the EU faces immediate and long-term challenges and dilemmas. The leadership team created at the end of 2024 is strong and the EU needs this team to work cooperatively and collaboratively to leverage its influence. Together they represent the EU.
The emerging 21st century global order/disorder does not suit the EU’s DNA, its history or its preferences. The European Union is the world’s strongest multilateral institution, and its member states strongly prefer a rules-based international order with regulated trade and security supported by the Transatlantic Alliance. The structural challenges facing the EU are geopolitical and geoeconomic. The global balance of power and authority structures are changing in multiple and unpredictable ways to the EU’s disadvantage. The EU’s main power sources, both in terms of norms and regulations, are insufficient and incomplete for the world in which Europe is located. A second Trump presidency will highlight challenges and dilemmas for the EU, as it will bring unpredictability, confusion and anti-EU bias to transatlantic relations. But the EU is not destined to be a plaything, and has institutions that are players in this evolving world system. To do so, we must learn how to navigate our emerging multipolar world and mobilize resources for collective action in key areas.
Challenge to a multipolar world
The bipolar world of the Cold War gave way to a short period of unipolarity, when the power and projection of the United States exceeded that of any other nation or group of nations in the world. Today’s world is multipolar, and neither the United States nor China has the power or influence to determine the rules of international politics. However, modern multipolarity is unbalanced because while these two states act as strong poles of attraction, there is also scope for other great powers to exert influence and project power. Middle powers are on the rise, especially Russia, Iran, Turkey, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Japan. Should the EU conclude at this point that it is a middle power, or should it aim to become a less powerful but still powerful pole of attraction than China or the United States? If the EU aims to become a global player, it should act as a pole of attraction for its neighbors and as a hedge against other countries vis-à-vis the two great powers.
The evolution of U.S.-China relations under the Trump administration will have a major impact on how Europe navigates a multipolar world. The balance between competition and cooperation is important for Europe. So is the level of security and economic vulnerability to either side. The EU has long debated the issue of strategic autonomy and now needs to decide on the actions needed to move towards the future in a proactive strategic manner. The world of jockey power and unpredictable politics values agility and adaptability. The EU needs to stand firm against both powers and be prepared to defend itself. The political agreement with Mercosur, signed on December 6, 2024, is an exemplary example of hedging U.S.-China relations and strengthening multilateralism in the world system. There is a good chance that the deal could stall due to opposition from European environmentalists and farmers, which would be a major sign of Europe’s weakness.
Europe must learn how to deal with the growing problems posed by destructive states, especially Russia, a great power determined to undermine European security and democracy. Europe is embroiled in a hybrid war with Russia, with the eastern half of the continent locked in a struggle to assert its sovereignty and independence as President Vladimir Putin seeks to regain control over former Soviet states. Ukraine is the country paying the highest price for Putin’s imperialist enterprises, but all former Soviet states are torn between pro-Russian and pro-EU countries. An important lesson for the EU over the past decade is that it is essential to support pro-EU forces in all these countries. Records are mixed. Belarus is firmly in the Russian camp, while Moldova is struggling to access energy following the closure of Ukrainian transport routes. Georgia has been rocked by protests following the government’s decision to freeze talks with the EU. The outcome of the Ukraine war, as well as political struggles in other former Soviet states, will shape the EU’s security and political landscape for decades to come. The EU still does not understand the full impact of Putin’s plan. Doing so will require the EU to mobilize and generate capacity for effective action.
mobilize one’s abilities
An analysis has been carried out. Both the Letta and Draghi reports set out in stark terms the need for Europe’s strategic investments in technology, climate change mitigation, defense and security. The EU is currently undergoing a period of important choices and trade-offs. The power bases of the past, values and markets, are insufficient. The EU needs to leverage public finance and collective borrowing to meet its geoeconomic and strategic needs. In the short term, we need to strengthen our capacity to support and protect Ukraine. It must do so through a joint effort across the EU, or, if unity is not possible, by a coalition of the willing. The pro-Russian stance of Mr. Orbán and Mr. Fico is in opposition to all EU initiatives. The default assumption in the EU is that the consensus among US elites supporting transatlantic defense is over. The Union Army must take seriously the need to find strategic objectives and military capabilities. This cannot be achieved without the involvement of non-EU European countries, in particular the UK, Türkiye and Norway.
The next decade is likely to be the most consequential for the EU and Europe as a whole since the end of World War II. There are no easy options, only hard choices and trade-offs. Failure to make decisions will further weaken Europe and undermine its independence and ability to play an important, if not dominant, role in the world. Although the challenges are immense, Europe has bounced back from the two world wars of the past 20th century and enjoyed 50 years of relative peace and prosperity. But political instability in Germany and France and the rise of the radical right in many countries complicate these choices, making trade-offs more difficult and dangerous. The EU is trying to determine whether it has the ability to forge its own future in this era, or whether it will succumb to transnational forces. Peace, prosperity and democracy are all at stake.
This article is part of the project “EU Forward” carried out by SocialEurope in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.
Brigid Laffin is Professor Emeritus at the Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI). She joined EUI in 2013 and retired from her position in August 2021. He was previously Professor of European Politics at University College Dublin. She is also Chair of the European Policy Center (EPC), Chancellor of the University of Limerick and Chair of its governing body.
