The big fanfare on the decision of India’s decision to acquire a French airline, which is based on a French airline, is now dead and the first criticism has appeared. Anonymous Indian Navy officers raised concerns about Rafare M’s conformity to career management, similar to the previous acquisition of MIG-29K.

Rafare M’s fixed wings restrict their maneuverability, occupy valuable deck space, reducing the number of aircraft that can be placed on Indian airlines, Ins Vikramaditya, and Ins Vikrant. In addition, Rafale M’s two -seater training variant is not a career -friendly. In other words, pilots miss the essential real world training for career management that depends on the simulator.
In contrast, MiG-29K’s two-seater trainer MIG-29KUB offers a more realistic training environment and can operate from his career. However, MiG-29K faced a unique problem with crashes and increased the dependence on the simulator. The officers, like MiG-29K, have pointed out that Rafare M is selected for the use by the Indian Air Force, streamlining logistics and reducing training costs.
These compromises in the design of Rafare M could affect the Navy’s preparation, emphasizing the challenges of integrating foreign technology into a specialized airline operation. The Navy may need to consider changing to a training infrastructure or increasing investment to reduce these problems.
Despite the greatness of this process, the slow decision process of India in weapon procurement is derived from the complex interaction of bureaucratic, strategic and historical factors.
At the core of this problem is a bureaucratic maze of the Indian defense acquisition system. The decision -making hierarchy includes multiple approval groups, from individual service branches to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Cabinet Committee on Security, and the Ministry of Finance.
This multi -layer system aims to secure accountability, following famous scandals such as BOFORS scandals in the 1980s, and prevents corruption, but it often has a large delay. The process is even slower due to the lack of a single point of accountability, and the decision can be passed through a large number of hands, leading to duplicate efforts and delays in comments and approval.
The lack of unified strategic vision has contributed to this slow pace. The military branch has historically pursued its own operation doctrine. The lack of this unity can be a reactive tracking, not a long -term strategic plan, but an aggressive tracking that promotes the decision by an immediate shortage or political pressure, rather than a long -term strategic plan. 。
In addition, Indian defense is suffering from past approaches to avoid past past, paradoxically leading to new mistakes. The fear of repeating the corruption scandal brings an excessive strict procedure, and the focus often shifts from functions to fault finding. This may cause potentially useful acquisitions to be rejected, or excessively or unrealistic requirements may be rejected.
Another complex layer comes from the international relations and defense partnership in India. India, which historically depends on Russian weapons, diversifies the source, negotiating technology transfer, and the political meaning of leaning on a geopolitical block that handles the standards of various suppliers. We have introduced new tasks such as managing. This diversification is necessary strategically, but adds a layer of negotiations and decision -making time.
The slow pace also reflects the economic constraints of India and budget management. Defense spending as a GDP is low, and combined with high costs related to modern and sophisticated weapons, it leads to financial bottlenecks to provide funds to new acquisitions. This means that even if the decision is made, the actual procurement may be delayed due to budget restrictions and further worsen delays.
This process is partly due to these systematic issues, but also due to lack of real -time monitoring and adaptation to changing technical landscapes. Since the project can drag for a very long time, if it is finally approved, the technology of the question may approach obsolete, it is already outdated, the need for an optimal investment and a quick and expensive upgrade. Connect to.
The exploration of the Indian Navy to strengthen career -based air military power has made a decisive turn with the choice of Dassola Falle M. Saga.
In 2017, the Navy aimed to won the Internet for the multi -roller carrier bone fighter (MRCBF) program, and aim to argue with a new type of fighter with a newly built Ins Vikrant. The trial held in a test facility based on the Navy coast of Gore was nothing more than a spectacle. Both candidates take off the high stakes ski jumping and arrested landing.
In July 2023, the Defense Acquisition Council gave a green light. Rather, we have accepted the need for 26 Rafare’s procurement. This decision wasn’t just about choosing a jet. It was about the strategic forecast of banks on the operation and logistics commonality with the existing Rafar Gets of the Indian Air Force. Rafare M, adjusted for a harsh life mounted on aircraft airlines, has been enhanced as a foldable wing prepared to process catapult -free operation from STOBAR carriers in India. I am proud of the landing device.
The negotiations were dancing before and after diplomacy and hard negotiations. By September 2024, India was able to ensure a significant price reduction and signaled a transaction equivalent to about 63,000 rupees (about $ 7.6 billion). Although this package was not only jet, it contained weapon suits such as long -range meteor missiles, anti -ship exosets, scalp cruise missiles, etc. in addition to the Indian Navy logistics, training, and custom correction.
This is not your mileage contract. It is an event from the government to the government, reflecting the Indian Air Force Ruffales’s 2016 contract. totalling? 22 seats and four two -seater trainers. For the first training, we will provide scenarios that have won both the Navy of both France and India, with the possibility of catching some used Rafare Marines.
The acquisition will be stopped and will hold the fort until 2031, the indigenous twin engine deck fighter (TEDBF) mature. This is not only to add teeth to Indian marine punches. To solidify the strategic alliance with France and add another layer to the more nervous defense partnership at the Indian Pacific Theater.
At the Navy Airlines High Stakes Arena, the Indian Navy’s decision to shift from MiG-29K to Rafale M caused a fierce debate as Jets itself.
MiG-29K, a stubborn Soviet era with Russian pedigree, is a backbone of an Indian airline, and works for both Ins Vikramaditya and the newly entrusted Ins Vikrant. 。 On the other hand, Rafare M, which has Frenn’s Fins and advanced technology, promises to enhance the navy’s ability to a new height.
Starting from MiG-29K, the aircraft has been the mainstay of the Indian Navy since the 2010 guidance. This is an all -weather multi -roll fighter designed to operate from an airline with enhanced growth and folding wings. However, it is not that there is no turbulent service life.
Maintenance problems, the possibility of obtaining spare parts, and some famous crashes draw pictures of fighters that are struggling to respond to modern Navy’s demands. However, thanks to the RD-33MK engine, it is known for its ease Ility, which can function in air-to-air and surface roles with considerable payload capacity.
Rafale M, on the other hand, brings more modern designs adjusted from zero for career management to the table. RBE2, an electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, gives a great advantage in the MIG-29K radar system detection range and engagement range.
The Rafale M design incorporates a reinforced structure for career life stress, such as arrested landing tail hooks and SKI-JUMP takeoff jump stress.
From the viewpoint of combat ability, Rafare M is not the only survival rate. That is about rule. The weapon suite, including a meteor’s missile that exceeds visual distance, offers strategic advantage in modern aerial warfare scenarios. French jets are also boasting better avionics and more comprehensive electronic warfare suite.
The range and payload capacity may be slightly excellent, but on the flip side, MiG-29K is a quarterly quarterly dogfight with its piloting, proving the reliability of a specific battle. I am.
However, conversations are not only raw fighting power. There are also logistics, training, long -term execution possibilities. Rafare M may benefit from the existing Rafare Fleet of the Indian Air Force and streamline maintenance and operation costs. Despite the problem, MiG-29K has been integrated into the Navy’s business for more than 10 years, providing a familiarity and operation knowledge that is not overlooked.
Both jets are set in the background of the Indian Navy’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean region, where cost, ability and continuity play an important role. MiG-29K days may be counted when Rafare M arrives. This is not for direct performance gaps, but for technical leap and strategic advantage.
However, in particular, the transition is not an issue in adapting pilots to new platforms and integrating them into existing Navy Airlines doctrine.
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