Earlier this month, Brazil announced that it was the first time for Southeast Asian countries to officially block the blocks of BRICS in 2025. The debate on the BRICS status in the Indonesian foreign policy, which is the debate on whether it simply expressed interest or pursuing a member. By confirming the membership of Indonesia, what means for the first important decision in the international situation, President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President President There is a question about how to consistent.
About status, not material interest
Over the past decade, Indonesia has emerged as a Chogen country, has been actively involved in efforts to solve the world’s crisis, and has participated in high-level forums such as the G-20. This approach is consistent with Indonesia’s “free and aggressive” foreign policy traditions, and has recently been typically shown by the worldwide involvement of the former Minister of Foreign Minister Letono Marsdi. Former President Joko “Djokowi” added personal touches by making investment and economic dominance as the basis of Indonesian foreign policy. As a result of a realistic approach, Jokowi chose to postpone Indonesia’s BRICS joining applications in 2023.
In contrast, Pravo Woo took a different approach. Only a few days after taking office, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sugi Ono was dispatched to the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia to formally apply for Indonesia. Furthermore, Prabowo has been traveling around the world since holding the administration, in contrast to Jokowi, who hesitates overseas unless it has immediate economic interests. This clear difference between the two leaders can be explained by understanding the behavior of the plastic wow.
Actions for positions will affect others’ recognition of the relative status of the state by gaining a symbol of prestige by gaining a symbol of prestige through the improvement of the recognition, the host of an event that attracts attention, the participation in the elite group, etc. You can understand it as an initiative. Prabowe has a stronger understanding of diplomatic issues than Jokowi, and believes that its status is a key currency in the world. Prabowoo may seek foreign policy issues focusing on visible qualities and assets to emphasize Indonesia’s achievements on the world stage. The first visit to Beijing and Washington, the first national guest of the President, complied with the agenda. Signing a controversial agreement with Mr. Xi Jinping and announcing a telephone talk with US President Donald Trump immediately after the election showed an important identifier in the actions of Indonesian status. As the proverb says, “I can’t envy something invisible.”
Middle power alone is not enough
The stage is an important factor in the status game. The background and experience of Prava Wow forms his diplomatic understanding, and the current international order, where Indonesia is regarded as a Chinese country, is not enough for Plabowo. Chodai is not the leading role in the world. Instead, they are supporting roles with flexible but limited screening time.
The influential Indonesia is the center of the Pravo Wow world view. His history as a soldier enhances the belief that hierarchy supports all interactions. He understands that countries like Indonesia have limited power and abilities, but their status has no such restrictions. The nation can pursue the desired position. Indonesia cannot be comparable to the United States or China in power, but can put itself in the same position. There are various forms equally, but most simply means to participate in conversations or forcibly participate in conversations.
For the next few years, the world’s stage will develop around Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. In this context, if you want to gain status, you are ready. The United States and China will control international exchange through the use of power and influence. In a hierarchical view, other countries must understand and work to deal with this relationship because they are safe in the logic of power, or to be appropriate in status logic.
According to Prabowo, Indonesia needs to improve its status to adapt to the Trump administration. Historically, Indonesia has maintained a balance between the United States and China and has maintained a stable relationship with the two countries. However, Trump changed significantly during the first presidential era, confusing the “normal” US -led US -liberal international order, creating new uncertainty. Looking at the world relations realistically, Trump is in tune with the people who serve US interests. Prabowawe regards this as a chance and attempted a dialogue with President Trump while visiting the United States in November. He never met, but he succeeded in calling. The critics considered this trip as bad, and questioned the value of moving thousands of kilometers for the phone.
Nevertheless, this interaction was important in the context of status, as Indonesia (at least symbolically) could be positioned as equivalent to the United States. But important questions arise: Is pursuing this position really important? Is it the ultimate goal for Indonesia? Status provides social legitimacy and perception, but how do you respond to the needs of the people of Indonesian people? Indonesia should prioritize the status, or it should aim for more specific results in foreign policy. Is there any question, as Indonesia is ready, because the higher the position, the higher the responsibility?
Is it the risk of going too much?
Prabowo’s enthusiasm to participate in BRICS member states in Indonesia and only to attract attention has revealed a foreign policy that has been moved by more personal ambition and strong needs for power than long -term strategic calculations. There is. The impulsive decision is often bypassing the hands of experienced diplomats, leading to inconsistent policies, and there is a risk of keeping the main partners away.
In particular, as the US -China conflict is intensifying, trying to relieve all sides can make Indonesia into a troublesome position. Western countries may interpret the synchronization of Indonesia’s BRICS member and China’s claims as a transition to China’s trajectory. At the same time, the BRICS member of Indonesia can be difficult to criticize Russia’s actions and maintain neutral in a new US -China trade war. Balancing these conflicting pressure will be an important issue for Indonesian diplomats who need to reassure their independent positions.
The BRICS episode in Indonesia provides lessons that Pravo woos are looking for approval and stage. While China and Russia provide opportunities through BRICS, the more the western countries criticize him, the closer he can approach China and Moscow. So far, China and Russia have gained his support. Currently, the United States and Europe must decide how to respond to Prabowo’s BRICS strategy.
