As the second Trump administration consolidates itself, Arab media has discovered that the president’s Middle East appointees are a “confused group of loyalties.” It vocally opposes war with Iran and advocates a diplomatic approach in the region.
Trump’s other picks, such as Marco Rubio for secretary of state and Mike Walz for national security adviser, are known to be hawks on Iran. (The nominee for Secretary of Defense is awaiting Senate confirmation.)
In addition to the (now suspended) war in Gaza, how to deal with Iran is the most salient question for Trump 2.0 US Middle East policy. How has the region changed since Trump was last in the Oval Office (2017-21)? And what factors can currently determine the alignment or divergence between Tehran and Washington?
Iran’s Vice President for Strategy Javad Zarif in Davos on January 22.
Iran and Trump 2.0
The situation in Iran has evolved considerably since Trump 1.0. The anti-Israel “axis of resistance” has weakened significantly, especially over the past year. However, Tehran has cultivated new positive relations with its Arab neighbors, which sprung out of the Saudi Alani settlement brokered by China in 2023.
Great changes have taken place within Iran. The country’s economic and social turmoil worsened under President Ebrahim Raisi (2021-24). It was in the race to succeed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader at the time of his death in May last year.
Under President Masoud Pezeshkian, Tehran has made megaphone its desire to work with the West to lift sanctions while warning against underestimating its military capabilities and projecting a position of strength through nuclear enrichment. .
At the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22, Iran’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs Javad Zarif said that Trump’s second term would require a more “rational” approach to Iran to ensure regional stability. He said he would like to see a “realistic” approach.
However, in their statements after Trump’s inauguration, both Zarif and Iran’s hardline leader made it clear that they should not be seen as weak.
It is clear that Tehran is looking for signals from Washington, even as it prepares for a return to the Trump 1.0 policy of “maximum pressure” through more sanctions.
Importantly, Zarif believes the 2018 decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal was imposed on Trump by Hawks such as former NSA John Bolton and former U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook. said.
Bolton, Hook and Hook’s former boss, Mike Pompeo, who was secretary of state from 2018 to 2020, have not found a place in the second Trump administration. Security protections for all three men were pulled on Jan. 23, two days after Dimino was appointed as the Pentagon’s Middle East policy director.
Government-affiliated Iranian media see all this as a positive sign of change.
Regional changes
When Trump first took office in 2017, the Arab world’s relations with Iran were in crisis.
In 2016, Saudi Arabia and Iran broke diplomatic ties over the execution of Saudi Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr. In 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) declared there would be no dialogue with Iran, and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeia accused Tehran of using proxies to undermine the sovereignty of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The unprecedented blockade of Qatar by the Arab League from 2017-21 was partly caused by Qatar’s seemingly warm relations with Iran. This was all neat with Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach.
Today, Arab countries prioritize regional stability based on economic diversification. Catalyzed by their opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza, they deepened their rapprochement with Iran. Riyadh and Tehran are exploring defense cooperation.
In November 2023, MBS declared that “Iran-Saudi relations are at a historic turning point.” That same month, an extraordinary joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Riyadh passed a resolution calling Israel’s actions in Gaza a genocide and calling for an end to the attacks.
The current situation in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq has increased Arab comfort for engagement with Iran. Bashar al-Assad’s regime has collapsed, Hezbollah has lost its senior leadership in Lebanon, and Iraq is working to arm or consolidate Iranian-backed groups. They are in the Iraqi army.
In November 2024, at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh, MBS warned Israel against Iranian attacks. Arab officials hope that Trump, in his second term, will recognize the new realities of the Middle East. This week Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister said he did not believe the United States would encourage war with Iran.
weighing engagement
The ceasefire in Gaza created the conditions for deliberations and contacts between Iran and the United States. The Trump administration has urged Israel to withdraw from Lebanon according to a schedule agreed to with Hezbollah, denying the Israel Defense Forces an expansion promised by the previous Biden administration.
The question is how Tehran and Washington will engage under Trump and both parties will have to lose face before conservative constituencies. Trump continues to hold Israel strongly and had ordered the first significant direct attack on Iran’s extraterritorial capabilities in 2020, along with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani Mas in Iraq.
It will also be considered whether the ‘maximum pressure’ returns will also take into account how new sanctions against Iran will affect global energy markets. This is already strained by US sanctions against Russia. level sanctions against Iran.
At a press conference held in New York in September 2024, candidate Trump then appeared to be making overtures to Iran. we have to make a deal. ”
Despite Trump’s (and Iran’s) dual perspectives, there is actually some space for alignment of objectives. For example, the possibility of a complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq is consistent with both Trump’s anti-war goals and Tehran’s goal of “expelling” the “occupier” from the region. Iran’s desire to reduce the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is consistent with Trump’s larger political philosophy.
As Israel lobbies for tougher U.S. boundaries against Iran in return for meeting Trump’s demands in Gaza and Lebanon, Arab states need to maintain U.S. support and Israeli cooperation for stability in the region. presents reconciliation with Iran as a key variable.
The question is: Will Trump make peace with a changed Middle East, or will it be the other way around?
Bashir Ali Abbas is a senior fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi
