Recent Interpretations of Bangladesh-Pakistan Melting

“Recent bilateral involvement between the two sides demonstrates Dhaka’s intention to diversify the trajectory of foreign policy in the subcontinent” | Photo credit: AFP

The bitter legacy of the 1971 liberation war, when Bangladesh split from Pakistan, has long piloted the nature of the relationship between Dhaka and Islamabad. However, recent bilateral involvement between the two sides demonstrates Dhaka’s intention to diversify the trajectory of foreign policy in the subcontinent. Since August 2024, there have been several meetings between Mohammed Yunus, the Chief Advisor of the Interim Bangladeshi Government and Pakistan Prime Minister Shebaz Sharif following the student-led rebellion. . In contrast, the lack of involvement between Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi sheds light on this changing equation.

Ms Hasina’s expulsion set the stage for a potential readjustment in the area. During Ms Hasina’s 15-year tenure, bilateral relations remained tense, partly due to the family’s historical dissatisfaction with the Pakistan ruling class. Her close alliance with India likely emerged as a key factor in her freezing relationship with Islamabad the following year. Tensions between Bangladesh and Pakistan peaked in 2016, with both countries expelling diplomats.

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Recent developments

However, under Yunus’ leadership, there was a strengthening of bonds. Several important developments and recent developments highlight this. Bangladesh, for example, hosted a high-level Pakistani military delegation in Langpur, near the strategically important Siliguri corridor. This was followed by Lieutenant Colonel Sum Kamru ul Hassan, deputy commander of the Bangladeshi Army, visited Rawalpindi and met with chiefs of the Pakistani army, navy and air forces. Dhaka also announced the resumption of direct flights to Islamabad and took part in Pakistan’s Aman 2025 Naval Exercises (February 7-11) in the Arabian Sea. .

Despite the obvious warming of the relationship, can these interactions be converted into meaningful outcomes? Or will they remain symbolic with almost any concrete influence?

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Earthly reality

Yunus has eased Dhaka’s demands to apologise for the “1971 genocide” that it simply wanted to “solve the problem,” but Dhaka faces challenges in managing public opinion. Masu. A considerable number of Bangladesh view their separation from Pakistan as the bedrock of their national identity. Without addressing this deeply ingrained historical grievance in the spirit of Bangladeshi society, considerable diplomatic progress appears unlikely in the long run. Islamabad is a product of an expression of Bengali identity, and in response to the excesses of the West Pakistan government, if it continues to frame the war of 1971 as an Indian plot, rather than acknowledging it as a separatist movement. It’s especially true. Furthermore, from a strategic and economic perspective, the partnership with Islamabad offers limited benefits for Dhaka, particularly given the inconsistency between the economic realities of both countries. Geographical separation between Bangladesh and Pakistan by Indian territory could create connectivity and political hurdles for smoother trade.

As India closely monitors the situation, diplomatic manipulation will be recognized as Pakistan’s efforts to counter the loose influence of New Delhi in Dhaka following the expulsion of Ms Hasina. Interestingly, these dynamics are also in line with the importance of India’s unprecedented warming relationship with the dominant Taliban in Afghanistan, a traditional ally of Pakistan. India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Mithri met Maurawi Amir Khan Muttaki, acting Foreign Minister of Dubai’s Taliban government in January.

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Overview of New Delhi’s approach

Is there a new cause of new concern in New Delhi, as the number of hostile neighbours is currently growing, including increasing consistency with the Maldives and Nepal’s China?

India’s approach to Bangladesh should be based on an understanding of economic and geographical reality. Despite the evolving nature of Dhaka-Islamabad ties, Bangladesh will find it obviously difficult to adopt an anti-Indian stance, given its geographical proximity and economic dependence on India. India remains Bangladesh’s major trading partner in the region. In 2023, India’s exports to Bangladesh were $11.25 billion, while Bangladesh’s exports to India were about $2 billion in 2023. Many of these imports, especially raw materials, are important for the Bangladeshi industry.

However, India must remain vigilant. The first is the range of axis that includes Bangladesh, China, and Pakistan, and the second is the issue of security in the Northeastern province. India must clarify the red line with Bangladesh in key regions such as terrorism, arms trade, joint military training and maritime security. While remaining firm on these issues, New Delhi should be constructively involved with Bangladesh, with a focus on people-to-people contact, cultural exchange and developmental projects. The two countries must also continue to cooperate on important issues of border trade and smuggling, water sharing and refugee concerns. To maintain this momentum, New Delhi must actively tackle anti-Indian and anti-Hindu sentiments common in Bangladesh, not only using economic involvement to strengthen its relationship with Dhaka , its financial involvement must be exploited. Maintaining a constituency that is beneficial to India within Bangladesh remains important for long-term strategic stability.

Aishwaria Sonabane is a research analyst at the Pakistan Desk of the Takshasila Association