The revelations sparked widespread debate about security measures during one of the most tense times in world history.
The thought of nuclear weapons and their destructive power often brings chills. However, many people were surprised when the facts about America’s nuclear security during the Cold War came to light. During the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War, the United States reportedly made shocking “mistakes” regarding the launch codes for nuclear bombs.
simple boot passcode
According to a former military officer in charge of managing nuclear missiles, the launch passcode for a U.S. nuclear bomb was an incredibly simple sequence: 00000000. The simplicity of this code makes it possible for a malicious actor to cause massive destruction simply by testing the probability of launching a nuclear weapon.
Used from 1962 to 1977
According to a report in the Daily Mail, the United States used this simplified code from 1962 to 1977. The logic behind this decision was ostensibly to prevent unauthorized Air Force personnel from launching a nuclear attack. However, choosing such an insecure passcode is still controversial.
Recently, Dr. Bruce Blair, a Princeton University scholar and former Minuteman missile launch officer, provided details from a declassified manual that confirms the passcode to be 00000000. Dr. Blair attributed this decision to tensions between President John F. Kennedy and Air Force generals. Cold War.
code is explicitly maintained
Dr. Blair revealed that during his service from 1970 to 1974, the launch checklist specifically instructed operators to ensure that the code on the lock panel remained 00000000. The protocol explicitly prohibited this change of order. This unsafe measure was reportedly introduced to prevent delays and accidents during a potential crisis.
air force denial
Following Dr. Blair’s revelations, the U.S. Air Force submitted a report to Congress in 2014 denying the long-term use of such simple and insecure codes. They disputed claims that the passcode remained 00000000 for an extended period of time and argued that nuclear security protocols were robust.
