How do you understand the enduring popularity of Imran Khan, former cricket hero of Pakistan and now imprisoning the former prime minister? Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui argues that understanding Khan-Politics requires recognition of a political scape that is fundamentally altered by the political commerce of social media.
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It has been almost two years since Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan was kicked out. However, his Pakistan Teherek-e-Insaf (PTI) party (Lit., “Pakistan Movement for Justice”) has continued to order widespread public support and has turned to imprisoned cricketer. Politicians remain the most popular leader in the country.
There is considerable debate about PTI’s “status antistatus quo” voting bank. The party challenges powerful military and mainstream parties through largely non-violent actions. However, equating this constituency with extreme populism in mature democracy is misleading. It blends the importance of familiar means of service delivery (democratic or authoritarian), even if there is a national consensus on political reform.
In my view, Khan’s populism is not a violent extremism, but a product of local political culture. In this post, to seek clarity, stakeholders think beyond their personal positions on the political spectrum, beyond the outdated Cold War era ratio trop, and media liberalization is based on identity. demonstrates that it has acknowledged that it has influenced the mobilization of the I don’t fully understand it yet. Therefore, deeper interrogation requires an understanding of communication strategies.
From populism to extremism
Globally, populism has invoked ultra-conservative leaders such as Donald Trump (USA), Narendra Modi (India), Boris Johnson (UK), and Marine Le Pen (France). Their views on immigrants and marginalized communities have been consistently scrutinized by the media. However, some communication scholars attribute a decent political program to populist leaders, and instead characterize it by opposing the recurring themes: idealized nations, integral peoples, corrupt elites. Note that we consider it a political style that can be attached.
Alvarez and Dahlgren point out that populism is an episode, manifested at moments of crisis, and is revolutionary but leaning towards “reform,” often with limited effectiveness. Although hostile to typical politics, they live in symbiotic life. Populism arises from the democratic tension between the sovereign “people” and the concept of liberal constitutionalism. The latter focuses on complex institutions and laws that limit the direct impact of “people” to protect individual freedoms. While constitutionalists struggle to effectively include citizen opinions and lead to alienation, it often ignores the need for constitutional restrictions on direct democracy. As traditional political institutions gather around the centre, many feel annoyed and abandoned, populism is an increasingly frequent outcome.
While debates on populism continue, Western observers are most concerned about populist tendencies towards extremism and violence. This has been recognized by Podemos, a newly formed Spanish “progressive” party born from the anti-austerity measures of 2011-12, for his populist style and active use of social media that attracts citizens.
Khan’s commentary on popularity often reflects the concerns of extremism without proper interrogation of local dynamics. To understand this, it is helpful to unravel Khan’s populist rhetoric from Pakistani political culture.
The consequences of political culture or violent extremism?
To understand Khan’s popularity, we need to look into the political message in Pakistan, where leader rhetoric is usually based on zero-sum competition with the enemy, and in the version “supporting us to save Pakistan” Let me summarize.
I have studied political rhetoric in local presses between 1992 and 2014, so I discovered that I cannot argue that political actors are controversial. The chairman of the then Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) Benazir Bhutto, through the ratio of corruption, incompetence, lack of popularity and Pakistan’s sacrifice, was his rival Nawaz Sharif (Pakistani Muslim League N, PML (n)) frequently criticized the Sharif was the protégé of the then military dictator Zia ul Hak, an image of the strength of the attractive modern Muslim Punjabi people who were able to carry out attractive infrastructure and consumer projects. I was predicting that. . In particular, Sharif was entrusted by the military in the mobilization against PTI’s Bhutto.
Therefore, if Imran Khan’s politics look controversial and extreme to some, it could be a result of a deeply entrenched populist style rather than a consistent ideological program. This makes sense to assume that PTI has no substance, like all mainstream parties and military regimes.
But my point is not to equate PTI politics with its rivals. This is a call for calm reflection in an age of polarization where our personal stance on the political spectrum is likely to cloud our judgment. This is a call to avoid strict binary dictionary from the Cold War era. Traitor vs. Patriots, honest vs. Corruption, Kaffir (pagan), freedom fighter vs. terrorist, religion, religion, left vs. right, and actually a few. I recall the slogan of Pakistan’s flagship feminist demonstration, Aurat March: “ye binary, wo binary, no binary!” (lit., “this binary”, “that binary”, “no binary”!)
The creation of a vocabulary to describe what is called the “healthy” Pakistani worldview is itself a controversy. The issue of Islamic national identity remains unresolved, and Pakistanis still struggle to move beyond “good Muslims, right-wing,” “bad Muslims, and Western liberal dichotomy.
Political Culture in the Information Age
In creating the sense of Pakistan, Farzana Shaykh argues that the main reason for the problematic relationship between Pakistan and Islam is that solutions are primarily materially sought. She has a generation of scholars inspired by the Neo-Marxist tradition of the Cambridge History School, viewed political and economic interests as causal factors for national dysfunction, not as symptoms of fundamental issues of national identity. I write that
This kind of cultural work is more challenging today, as new media shapes debate in unexpected ways. In a very short time, Pakistan has changed from “many” to “many” social media logic, from “many” to “many” as messaging is driven by the state’s broadcast logic, where “one to many” is flowing . This change promoted people-centered politics, which was not even a decade ago when public discourse was dominated by Elite, critics and special interests.
Outside of the mainstream, the ethnography of working-class Muslim women in Tiktok in Sidra Kamran, Pakistani women express their sexuality in innovative ways and promote conservative social change. This shows how to challenge cultural norms. Mainstream, PTIs in the Khan era effectively utilize grassroots pressure via social media. A study of the online activities of four major national parties during the 2013 general election found that PTI Twitter messages were the most diverse, interactive and problem-based. The real-time updates have called on citizens to vote through online and offline campaigns.
The PTI meeting exemplifies a media-driven mobilization characterized by contemporary and spiritual music, lively lighting and engaging speeches. Old and young, celebrities and opinion leaders, taking part in these events and remotely through the big screen, create a festive atmosphere in which participants from across the social strata are integrated. Despite the populist style, many experiences with these glasses have been adiversity, energetic, hope, in contrast to the fossilized ratios of sacrifice, injustice, infidel, veil women, ethics, non-same-sex authorities. , change, sovereignty, postmodern Muslims of Pakistan. and the victims, where collective action was traditionally based.
It’s no wonder that in February 2024, millions of elections voted for “independent” candidates under military repression, and De Jure, the emergence of PTI, voted as the biggest parliamentary party. . It was the last time Pakistanis stood against one platform in the late 1970s, along with Zulfikar Alibutt, the father of Pakistan’s third (and present) constitution. Such public momentum can drive key initiatives such as rebuttals and reform in the tenant economy. The Covid-19 crisis demonstrates that the issue of service delivery requires thoughtful collective action beyond abstract debates about democracy and dictatorship.
Building a nation through the media
Is it the fact that Khan’s populism appeals to local and diverse social groups and is very bad in the diaspora (including working-class citizens of the Islamic Party)? What practical solutions do secular Pakistanis have for the unity of objectives beyond the practices of learning circles and ballrooms?
The literature on hate speech shows that no matter how satisfied citizens are, political entrepreneurs promote myopia and anxiety about selfish purposes. Against hatred suggests that it is easier to govern small, homogenous communities than diverse groups.
Understanding Naya (lit., ‘new’) in Pakistan is complicated and rooted in the context. The experiment began with the media liberalization policy in the early 2000s as a weak state strategy to improve capacity through cultural production. Although it gives voice to diverse citizens, policies like a single national curriculum highlight potential overloads.
Khan was known and recognized worldwide long before populism became a buzzword (as one of Pakistan’s most successful and attractive cricketers), so organizing popularity in extremism is dishonest is. Pakistan’s historical burden exceeds the trends of mature democracy.
It will get worse before it gets better. But there is an opportunity for those who want to embrace radical change. In reality, it’s not just words.
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Banner Image © Kashif Afridi, Pakistan, 2021, Unsplash.
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