Turkey has undoubtedly experienced a pivotal moment in political history. The results are clearly difficult to foresee, but they include the seeds of potential changes in the balance of power, which will tell you a major change in time.
The results of the March 2024 local elections were early signs of this shift. Since it first came to power in 2001, the Judicial Development Party (AKP), led by Receptap Erdogan, has enabled the major opposition party, the Republican National Party (CHP), to take control of all major urban centers.
Since then, the administration has been visibly strengthened. Increased arrests of political enemies and journalists, fire of around 10 elected mayors, legal proceedings against Chushiad leaders (major employers associations)… This list is a long list of people suffering from the degradation of democratic rights that have already been heavily eroded.
It intersected the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamolu on March 19, 2025. He is a qualitative leap as he emerged as a major opposition to the administration a few days before his expected designation as a CHP candidate in the upcoming presidential election. Comfortably re-elected in 2024, the mayor of Istanbul embodied a widely used phrase due to Erdogan himself.
Ekrem Imamoğlu was originally a conservative family member in the Black Sea region, a widely regarded manager of the city with 16-17 million residents, accounting for around 40% of Turkey’s GDP. He defends a more arbitrary form of secularism than traditionally promoted by his own party, demonstrating his ability to compromise with Kurdish parties and associations, particularly in Istanbul. So he’s ticking down many of the boxes that appear as a “reformer” and become serious candidates for the presidency.
The allegations against him are the head of financial fraud subs, contract integration and “profit-driven criminal organizations” – very few. This decision is perceived as more politically motivated than anything else. In doing so, President Erdogan appears to have made a rare miscalculation in domestic affairs, suggesting the hastily movement and loss of the social antennae that allowed him to win his previous elections.
This is even more important as votes in Türkiye are considered almost sacred civic acts, along with voter turnouts that regularly approach 90%. And by imprisoning mayors of the nation’s largest city, the administration risks undermining its own legitimacy basis. Erdogan has always relied on election legitimacy to embody popular will.
This context helps explain the scale and intensity of the voluntary protest that has erupted in the days after Imamol’s arrest and has continued since. The student population (7 million is strong, 8.2% of Turkey’s total population (compared to 4.4% in France) is particularly mobilized. Knowing nothing other than AKP rules, they express a clear desire for change, showing a sense of creativity and often chewing humor. Their initiative has launched boycotts of government-controlled media and companies. Many university lectures have also been boycotted, and recently secondary schools have begun to follow suit.
For now, CHP is riding on this wave and taking up these initiatives. The party’s long-standing internal vote to select presidential candidates proceeded on March 23rd despite Imamol’s arrest and was opened to all citizens. The result was a genuine referendum, with 15 million votes being cast. The party has only 1.5 million members.
Similarly, President Erdogan’s attempt to undermine the growing political convergence between the CHP and the equality of the people and the Democratic Party (DEM) appears to have failed for now. DEM Leadership explicitly condemned the arrest of Mayor Istanbul and took part in protests and rallies.
These developments clearly demonstrate the rejection by most Turkish society, which appears to have lost its bearings. In addition to tension, the alliance between the AKP and the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) appears to be weakened. Its aging leader, Devlet Bahçeli, said that if the lawsuit against Imamol is unfounded or inadequately demonstrated, he should be released without delay. He also opposed the idea that the state would appoint a trustee to replace the CHP in another case. These statements are more important from men who have consistently defended the established order and national authority throughout his political career.
Lastly, it was Bahceri himself who proposed a political solution to the Kurdish questions in October 2024. His amazing initiative received his first response from AbdullahÖcalan on February 27, 2025. He lays weapons on the PKK and asks them to disband. This is a process based on expanding democratic rights, and is a Sine Qua Non for positive outcomes.
There has been little specific information since then, but the outlook for the PKK parliament to officially make Öcalan’s proposal comes into play. We are not yet at that point, but it appears that the process is in progress. Support from Iraqi Kurdish leaders in the Öcalan call and agreement reached between Syrian democratic troops under Mazurum Abdi and Ahmed al-Challa on March 10, 2025 suggest that Kurdish questions are evolving in areas where the PKK is visibly weakened.
On this issue, President Erdogan has so far shown little tendency to submit concrete proposals in negotiation games that could prove a complicated game. The obvious paradox is that Bahçeli is deducing more clearly in terms of what he considers as a higher strategic interest in the Turkish region, and appears to be far more committed to looking at the process. For him, it is essential to eliminate the destabilizing factors that the PKK represents and seize the opportunities presented by its weakening. In contrast, Erdogan is more cautious, focusing on attracting primarily Kurdish voters and securing parliamentary representatives in anticipation of the possibility of constitutional reform that he can stand once more in the next presidential election. Splitting roles – or true differences between two partners?
Clearly, Türkiye’s political landscape is undergoing a real change. But the political crisis has crystallized, but it is not yet a regime crisis, and Erdogan still has political, financial and oppressive resources that should not be underestimated. There is a real risk of fatigue environments and there is no internal division immunity that can impair mobilization capabilities. Moreover, nationalism is a powerful force, even among protesters, and continues to form a political landscape. Without it
