Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a frequent visitor to the United States. However, his visit this week is significantly comparable to his first trip as PM in 2014.

After years of being denied a visa, Modi established himself as a political rock star at the Madison Square Garden Show in New York, and formed a strong partnership with Barack Obama in Washington, DC, and his commitment to a strategic partnership. sent a clear geopolitical signal about. And it set the stage for the last decade of serious ties across three US administrations.
This time, Modi is back in America as an elder politician. Most leaders in the Western democratic world are in power unless Modi has comparable political experience. In the expansionist world, despite criticism that he may face from the opposition at home, Modi continues to be a symbol of responsible international leadership.
This gives Modi the height, as reflected in the early invitation to the White House. He will also be a key interlocutor in diversifying the maritime sector, technology and supply chains in China, the Global South and Western Asia. And it gives him room to navigate the biggest democratically sanctioned political turmoil of the century ongoing in the United States.
That’s what President Donald Trump is trying for his second term. From redesigning the American nation, to climate-sensitive energy policies, to being renewed as a spokesman for white society, to understanding world trade only through the lens of the American trade deficit, the Western hemisphere’s US domination. Trump is reshaping his country and the world to propose an extraordinary solution to a crisis like Gaza to dismantle the entire American global development support program, like South Africa, to reclaim old structures. .
And if it were Modi’s 2014 visit set the stage for a certain kind of relationship with the US, his 2025 visit would form political, economic and strategic relationships with another US This is the key reason for doing so. India has wisely decided to continue to deepen its ties with the US. The importance of visiting lies in the way this is translated into actions.
Political risk, political opportunity The fact that India was enthusiastic about early visits is a hallmark of Modi’s risk-taking appetite. Because there is no guarantee that your visit will go as smoothly as your last two visits in June 2023 or September 2024. .
With very short staffed White House and vacant seats throughout the US embassy in the State Department, the Pentagon and India, the US side has not done proper homework, and Trump has particularly noted about his guest political optics. It is not known to be sensitive. The way the administration sent the first batch of illegal immigrants.
But obviously, the Indian system is doing cost-benefit analysis. Given the personal bonhomy between Trump and Modi, the system is on track to meet, bringing the Indian side to know all the top decision makers in Trump’s world. Delhi has already sent preemptive signals on trade and immigration to ease the pitch. The bet shows how the lecture sends a full picture message from Trump and Modi about a deeper vision of bonds, and how to deal with divergence based on convergence, India willing to remove stimulants and exist It’s about telling the United States. A partner in sharing burdens. Given India’s keen need for the US, Delhi owns relationships, lives with the new American reality, and hopes that this new reality can also offer opportunities.
Just as economic risks and economic opportunities exist, economic risks remain. The US has already imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, and Trump’s decision to announce this week’s reverse tariffs would straighten India to the shooting line.
Shaumitro Chatterjee, an assistant professor of economics and trade expert at John Hopkins University, calculates that India ranks eighth in the country where the US has a trade deficit. In the sector, the numbers are strict based on the average tariffs from 2021 to 2023. In agriculture, the most politically sensitive sector, India’s average tariff on US imports is 41.8%, while the US’s average import tariff is 3.8%. Between 2021 and 2023, the average US Agri export was $1.6 billion, while exports to India to India were $7.1 billion. For transport equipment, the average tariff in India is 14.9%, while the average tariff in the US is 0.9%. India’s exports in the sector were $4.4 billion between 2021 and 2023, while US exports to the US were $0.9 billion. From pharma to stones, glass, metals, pearls, it’s the same story. India has higher tariffs than the US, and India exports to the US more than other methods.
But that is also where the Indian system clearly smells of opportunity. India has inevitable domestic political constraints in some sectors, but overall policies over the past three years have been pushed, sealing off trade agreements with key partners. I want to find a way to reduce the trade deficit with China. Even Indian plans know that openness is necessary. I have made the decision to cut job duties for various items and have sent signals to my recent budget. He is willing to buy more energy and defense systems from the United States. And there is the openness of working with the United States to aim for a broader trade agreement. Rather than making tariffs the sole headline, the Indian system bets on the fact that externally induced pushes could lead to both internal reform and comprehensive understanding of bilateral trade. It would be better to build it now.
Strategic risks, strategic opportunities increase strategic risks in relations with the United States. Washington, DC has overturned its own commitment to global issues that are important to India (climate, health and development support). It almost began to launch a war with the Global South (think Gaza, South Africa, Panama). Contradictions with allies are merely growing. And China’s policies are plagued by uncertainty. Nowadays, everyone wants to cut bilateral deals with the US, but we will see how they respond to American bullying in the end.
The Indian system appears to bet on the fact that even if the breadth of strategic partnership with the US decreases, the depth of relationships in key areas will grow. This includes the possibility of cooperation in the Middle Eastern European Economic Corridor (IMEC) of India. This includes more technical cooperation, including the US system’s acquisition of India’s defense, more operational coordination among the military, and the possibility of the Trump administration relaxing export control regulations in key areas. This involves India finally opening the door for nuclear business with the US, particularly in the area of small modular reactors. It also includes more clarity and adjustments to China’s challenges and other South Asian challenges.
Their real test is how elder politicians and great destroyers shape the future of Indian and US bonds based on past connections. The stakes are high.