The war between Russia and Ukraine has become the major geopolitical crisis of the 21st century. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many countries, including the US, UK, EU, Australia, Canada, and Japan, have imposed more than 19,535 sanctions against Russia. Their main focus was on Russian financial resources. Approximately half of total reserves ($350 billion) were frozen, impacting foreign exchange reserves. According to the EU, around 70% of Russian banks’ assets were frozen by the high-speed messaging service for financial institutions.
The war between Russia and Ukraine undoubtedly affected relations between Moscow and its allies. Following the imposition of sanctions on Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a major shift toward China, signing a series of agreements. The impact of this war was not only on Russia’s relations with the West, but also on Russia’s close allies. In this regard, Central Asian countries are currently forced to strike a difficult balance between their long-standing relationships with Russia and other great powers. Although the region has historically relied on Russia for economic and security reasons, the protracted conflict is creating new challenges and possibilities, prompting these countries to pursue more aggressive but cautious foreign policies. There is. At the same time, this upheaval and Russia’s dependence on China create a golden opportunity for China to strengthen its ties with Central Asia.
For all the latest news, follow The Daily Star’s Google News channel. However, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the five Central Asian countries have become more politically and economically independent. Historically, the Central Asian Republics (CAR) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have always regarded Russia as a security guarantor for internal stability and protection from foreign threats. Since their independence from the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries have faced a difficult transition from a common Soviet history to different paths of state-building and economic liberalization. Five Central Asian countries are members of one or more Russian-led organizations, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union. These institutions provide a forum for regional security and economic cooperation with Russia, allowing Russia to maintain significant influence in the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. For example, when the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in 2021, Russia stationed military equipment on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border as part of the CSTO and conducted joint military exercises with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan within 20 kilometers of the Afghan border. . The exhibition aims to demonstrate Russia’s military preparedness in its own backyard in the event of an attack on Central Asia by the Taliban or other terrorist organizations. Similarly, in January 2022, Moscow sent CSTO soldiers to quell an uprising in Kazakhstan.
Economically, Central Asia was dependent on Russia. Russia’s energy and trade participation in the region was aimed at locking the government into critical dependencies and giving the Kremlin control over domestic and foreign policy decisions. For example, Kazakhstan exports 80 percent of its oil through the Caspian Sea oil pipeline, which passes through Russian territory. The number of economic migrants who go to Russia for work is relatively large compared to other migrant workers around the world. For example, approximately 9 million Central Asians live and work in Russia, and virtually all major cities depend on their labor. According to a June 2022 report by the United Nations’ International Organization for Migration (IOM), remittances from Russia to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan accounted for 31% and 27% of GDP, respectively, in 2020. The majority of these remittances are expected to come from employees in Russia. In 2021, remittances from Russia accounted for 55% of total remittances to Uzbekistan and 51% of total remittances to Kazakhstan.
However, internal unrest in Central Asian countries, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and growing concerns over their sovereignty have forced Central Asian countries to look for new allies for long-term security cooperation, and Russia’s influence has forced Central Asian countries to look for new allies for long-term security cooperation. It is diversifying its foreign policy to reduce its power. Furthermore, Western sanctions against Russia have led Central African countries to seek alternative routes to sell their goods to global markets. Central African countries are therefore seeking to improve their geopolitical interests in a variety of ways, including maintaining economic ties with Russia, avoiding overt criticism of Moscow, and strengthening partnerships with other world powers such as China, the West, and Turkey. We have responded to changes in the situation.
Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Central Asian leaders have been at the forefront of a so-called “multi-vector” foreign policy approach, aiming for balanced relations not only with Russia but also with other countries such as China and the West. standing. , and Türkiye. Countries in the region have refused to accept Russia’s recently occupied areas of Ukraine, and some have issued public declarations in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity early in the 2022 war.
Nevertheless, these powers did not openly condemn Vladimir Putin and his “special military operations”. A variety of factors are at play here, including economic dependence, immigration from Central Asia, and membership in Russian-led institutions.
Furthermore, polls show that a majority of Central Asians (70% in Kyrgyzstan, 55% in Kazakhstan, and 30% in Uzbekistan) believe that the region’s current economic difficulties are due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. There is. The popularity of the Russian language is declining, entertainment venues are refusing to admit Russian performers, and there have been multiple anti-war protests in Almaty and Bishkek. Russia has blocked Central Asian media sites for trying to provide unbiased coverage of the Ukraine conflict. Public conversation has returned to the topic of decolonization.
On the other hand, Central Asia is a strategically important region for China, as it shares rich resources, transportation networks, and borders that are critical to China’s security. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is capitalizing on growing insecurity and Russia’s focus on Ukraine to highlight its interests in the region. Central Asian countries are increasingly dependent on China for both security and economic resources, potentially challenging Russia’s dominance and endangering Russia’s security interests. China’s economic growth may soon allow Russia to counter Moscow’s geopolitical influence in Central Asia, despite a recent decline in historical hostilities between the two countries. I believe that.
Notably, China has taken advantage of Central African countries’ concerns about Russia to help them strengthen their security and law enforcement capabilities. During his visit to Central Asia in September 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that, given these exceptional circumstances, he supports Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity. When President Xi called for the China-Central Asia Summit to be held in Xi’an in May 2023, he emphasized the importance of the security, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries. As power plays intensify between the world’s most powerful countries, Beijing is taking major steps to expand its influence in the region to counter the US encirclement of China.
China remains focused on long-standing regional goals. More than half of China’s trade and investment goes to Kazakhstan, which Beijing views as a major economic partner in Central Asia. China’s economic interests are further supported by transportation opportunities that have emerged since the Russian invasion.
With growing concerns about insecurity in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Beijing is increasingly interested in serving as a provider of security in the region. This development could cause future difficulties with Moscow. Security cooperation between China and Central Asia has already been strengthened by the Belt and Road Initiative. A stronger security ally such as China could undermine Russia’s position as a key security guarantor. China’s growing influence in Central Asia after the invasion poses a challenge to Russia’s dominance and could change the dynamics of security cooperation, creating future complications for Russia. .
Dr Tariqul Islam Tanvir is an Erasmus Scholar on the International Master’s Program in Central and Eastern European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
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