According to a report published by Washington-based Rand Corporation, the structure, culture and organization of PLAs is designed to serve CCPs that inherently limit their ability to truly be combat-responsive forces. . Although operational capabilities are required to some extent, it follows the PLA’s primary mission to support CCP rules.
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China is not ready for war, according to controversial reports from US think tanks. This argued that the major drivers behind the widespread military modernization of the ruling Communist Party were maintaining a grip on power rather than facing foreign enemies.
Under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Beijing actively expanded its military capabilities. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has once reached levels where even among Asia’s strongest troops, analysts believe they are, or even surpassing, rivals in certain regions.
Despite repeated simulations by US defense experts being widely recognized as the world’s most powerful military, the US is in conflict near China’s coast, particularly the autonomy that Beijing claims itself It shows that they will struggle in conflict over Taiwan, an island.
However, a report released last month by Washington-based RAND Corporation raises questions about the fighting preparations of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) despite impressive weapons and substantial military spending.
The report, entitled “Is Chinese Army really built for war?” challenges the assumption that large, well-equipped troops automatically lead to effective combat power. The PLA’s main focus claims it continues to support the rules of the Communist Chinese Party of China (CCP). This is a mission that often conflicts with the development of true combat capabilities.
The report includes historical figures such as the loss of nationalists in the Chinese civil war of the Qing Dynasty’s technically superior navy in the first Chinese war, and the loss of nationalists in the Chinese civil war despite having better weapons. Similar to the example.
“History repeatedly shows that sometimes the military cannot effectively use advanced weapons in combat,” the report states. He also pointed out recent examples of Russian struggle in Ukraine, highlighting the disconnect between peacetime military displays and actual wartime performances.
The important question raised by the report is, “What is the purpose of the Chinese military?” All military forces are ostensibly present to protect the nation, but their actual functions can vary widely. The report argues that the historical and current focus of the PLA is on ensuring the continued power of the CCP at the expense of combat readiness.
“The Chinese military is essentially focused on supporting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule rather than preparing for war,” the report argued.
The report traces the history of Pra and focuses on the evolution of combat effective forces during the Chinese civil war into politically reliable after the CCP victory. In the post-Korea era, the PLA prioritized internal security and political loyalty to combat skills, even in its modernization efforts. The China-Vietnam War in 1979, when the PLA suffered a major loss, exposed the costs of this focus to political credibility.
China has poured billions into military modernization, but the report argues that the investment is primarily intended to strengthen CCP legitimacy domestically and internationally.
The report questiones the story that China’s military accumulation is primarily intended to conquer Taiwan. Taiwan’s importance to CCP legitimacy is exaggerated, claiming that Chinese leaders have not shown any real interest in starting a war, and that the PLA has surprisingly little preparation for Taiwan’s invasion. did.
“Chinese leaders have shown little interest in starting a war,” the report said. He further pointed out the lack of a detailed analysis of Taiwan’s conflict in Chinese military writings and the lack of public mobilization for war.
The report suggested that the PLA’s political management mechanisms could hamper the effectiveness of its combat, while ensuring loyalty to the party. It also raises serious questions about the PLA’s true capabilities and war capabilities, suggesting that its impressive hardware could mask underlying weaknesses attributed to political priorities.
