If 2024 is the year of elections, 2025 will be the year of geopolitics. At least that is the case in South Asia, where every country in the region (except Nepal) went to the polls within 12 months. But for India in 2025, geopolitics will take precedence over domestic politics.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was re-elected for a third consecutive term in 2024, despite its weakened powers. The country faces a limited election schedule this year, with only two states – Delhi and Bihar – voting. In this context, the Modi government’s focus will shift to strengthening the economy (GDP growth slowed to 5.4% in the third quarter of 2024) and pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy.
Regarding the latter, India faces several milestones this year. New Delhi will host the presidents of the United States and Russia, the former as part of India hosting the Quad summit for the first time, and the latter as President Vladimir Putin’s first visit to the country since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It happens. India is also likely to announce the conclusion of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (updating its 2030 roadmap) with renewed momentum towards concluding a free trade agreement. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s announcement this week that he is resigning as party leader could also reset relations between New Delhi and Ottawa following allegations of Indian complicity in the assassination of a Canadian on mainland Canada in 2023. Raising expectations about sex. -India relations have historically improved under Conservative governments in Ottawa.
The fate of India’s foreign policy depends largely on developments beyond its own control.
Progress will also continue on the operationalization of an agreement reached in October 2024 between China and India aimed at easing tensions along their disputed border. This could lead to talks between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS in Brazil, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in China, and/or the G20 summit in South Africa.
Pakistan will gain a two-year seat on the UN Security Council and could use that position to internationalize its persistently fractious relationship with India. Relations with Bangladesh will also be tested after the Dhaka government filed an extradition request for Sheikh Hasina, who has been living in India since being deported in August.
All these developments have occurred in a more volatile global geopolitical climate, accelerated by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The fact that both Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and External Affairs Minister Vikram Misri visited Washington in late 2024 underscores New Delhi’s concerns about further turmoil in India-US relations under the next US president. is implied.
Russia and Ukraine tests
One of New Delhi’s first tests will come with President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in the first half of this year. Up until now, India has managed to maintain close ties with Russia and the West, while setting itself apart from other Russian allies such as China, North Korea and Iran. While New Delhi maintains that India’s status as the world’s largest democracy puts it in a different position than Russia’s other partners and therefore separates it from the so-called “authoritarian axis”. , in Ukraine, which India insists is not a strategic enabler of Russia’s war.
However, this narrative is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, as noted by the revelation that India is the second largest supplier (after China) of restricted critical technologies to Russia. Last year, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 19 Indian companies as part of an investigation into third-country sanctions evaders. This comes after the EU imposed sanctions on an Indian company for the first time in its 13th round of sanctions against Russia.
In the same month that Jaishankar visited Washington, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh visited Moscow and described the friendship between India and Russia as “higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest ocean.” Ta. Beyond this rhetoric, there has been real progress, with India commissioning a Russian stealth frigate and the two countries announcing their largest energy deal yet.
The limits of strategic autonomy
Speaking at the 2024 Munich Security Conference, Jaishankar said India should be “lauded” for maintaining “multiple options” in its foreign policy. This hints at India’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy, a reinterpretation of the Cold War-era form of nonalignment. It is also framed as a multi-alliance, all-alliance, and “multi-vector” foreign policy, which essentially means that New Delhi has been working with key poles of influence in the international system, namely with Moscow in the midst of the Ukraine war. It means Washington is trying to maintain relations with both countries. For example, against the backdrop of instability in the Middle East, both Tehran and Tel Aviv. New Delhi has been reluctant to even get drawn into the US-China conflict, and recent border agreements between China and India demonstrate efforts by both countries to establish guardrails in bilateral relations.
The Modi government will hope that President Trump’s return to the White House will bring some relief to India, as a more conciliatory US approach towards Russia will ease scrutiny on India-Russia relations. New Delhi will also be watching closely for signs that instability in the Middle East is subsiding, as Israel scales back its military operations in Gaza and Lebanon and a weakened Iran tempers its belligerence. This will help revive India’s connectivity initiatives in the region, such as I2U2 (Israel-India-UAE-US) and IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor).
But the fate of India’s foreign policy depends largely on developments beyond its own control. What will happen if the war in Ukraine or the Middle East escalates? What if President Trump’s penchant for transactional foreign policy leads to “deals” with China and a resurgence of G2-type accommodation between Beijing and Washington? Under these circumstances, can India continue to maintain the “multiple options” mentioned by Jaishankar? I’m afraid not.
