Two things will change the political future of Europe. The first is the rise of Germany (AFD) right-wing alternatives and the high possibility of Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) as the next German Prime Minister. The second is the Donald Trump administration’s attempt to determine European security against the head of Europe. The latter means that Europe urgently needs security architectures, in particular its own nuclear deterrent.
In theory, France or the UK could provide nuclear power as a baseline. However, it is unlikely that these will be placed under European orders, or that other parts of Europe will be keen on the second nuclear umbrella, which is entirely dependent on French or British technology. Doing so would lead to de facto hegemony of the defense industry in either state. And as German politics moves to the right, Berlin’s collapse as a mediator will only lead to the acceleration of “two-speed Europe.”
The end of ultranationalism
Since the 1990s, signifying the end of EU politics, particularly the ultranationalism that defined Germany, means that member states prioritize cooperation between greater resources and economic cooperation. Traditionally, all Democrats pursued pro-EU courses and preferred all-comprehensive solutions over intergovernmental ideas. This led to policies such as the introduction of the euro, which adopted the ideals of almost all member states.
However, over the past two decades, individual foreign policies increasingly linked to the brave, far-right movements across Europe, political divisions around migration, and national identity politics have led to a collapse of consensus. The ongoing quest for EU integration has stagnated, with Germany filing a lawsuit as it receives nationwide, practical glue that stabs the EU together. Perhaps the next government under Mertz, on paper, on the centre right, the country is threatened with its own anti-EU, right-wing populism loudly. This is most dramatically seen in the rise of AFD.
Now, as the right-wing party puts pressure on the CDU and the next prime minister, issues surrounding nuclear deterrence are looming, Mertz is looking for a strong alliance with similar prospects. Given the importance of Germany’s economy and its role in the debate on European nuclear deterrence, these changes to domestic and foreign politics are a major shaking over the EU issues.
Accept “Hansa 2.0”
The political landscape fluctuates, but aside from Poland, which is often defined as extremes, the relatively weak far-right (Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands) have similar economic and security benefits. They tend to have lower public debt, have investment space for innovation, feel threatened by Vladimir Putin’s Russia and are disappointed with Trump’s Ukrainian “trading.” The country’s group could be called “Hansa 2.0”, but the idea was previously unaffected as major countries like Germany were indifferent to the intergovernmental approach.
Instead, they embraced the institutionalization of power in Brussels. This included traditionally major EU partners such as France and Italy that support su prolongation.
But things have changed. Currently, ideally Spain and Portugal will accompany this Hansa 2.0 group. However, France, Hungary and Italy are unlikely to participate as the rise in far-right political movements differ from the economic and safe interests. Historically speaking, one of the most serious spats between Hansa 2.0 and Southern Europe has been the issue of innovation funding. This has plagued the EU during the eurozone crisis. This could again create tensions in the looming issue of debt reciprocating to create a financial room for further government spending to support Europe’s economic recovery.
Stepping on a lonely path
Furthermore, in light of Ukraine’s “peace negotiations” held by Trump and President Putin on the heads of Europeans, the general European defense mechanisms and the need for nuclear deterrent remains as ever.
Over the past few weeks, the US government has refused to continue acting as a provider of European security. In theory, France could seize a moment of Europeanization and modernization of its nuclear capabilities, but it is very unlikely that Emmanuel Macron would abandon the state order over its independent nuclear strike capabilities. Instead, France called for EU countries to fund modernization of their forces, and demanded that the order be left in Paris. This is an unattractive offer to other parts of Europe and we don’t want to conquer that security to one national player.
Other French alternatives – building a second nuclear umbrella using its own technology is also unattractive, raising concerns that this will strengthen French technological hegemony. French EU partners will instead request unconstrained technology sharing. However, France’s appetite for Europeanization is already low and could decline even further as the country’s election campaign 2027 gets closer. Centrist candidates fear right-wing figures such as Marine Le Penn from the National Rally and accuse them of not being “national” enough. As a result, France may drop out as a trusted security guarantor for Europe and accept its own intergovernmental path without Germany.
Germany holds the chip
If the incoming German government adopts a progressive approach, then we can enter into a fair nuclear conversation with Paris, if it is achievable in a scenario where progressive parties are unlikely to have a parliamentary majority. However, in light of the current situation, all forms of “Hansa 2.0” could debate the development of its own nuclear deterrent forces that purchase technology not only from France, but also from the UK, the US and possibly Israel (if there is an alternative to increasing negotiating power with France).
Judging from Mertz’s political track record, he does not seem interested in slow, long-term negotiations or begging France. Instead, observers can expect a consensus of comprehensive security and innovation that reaches Germany from the Balkans across Poland and beyond, and expect to end in the Netherlands and Scandinavia
In such a scenario, passionately central European Meltz is the key accelerator. Judging from his political track record, he doesn’t seem interested in slow, long-term negotiations either. Also by begging France. Instead, observers can expect a consensus of comprehensive security and innovation that reaches Germany from the Balkans across Poland and beyond, allowing them to end in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. In an ideal scenario, major integration will leap into innovation funding and traditional nuclear defense and nuclear defense carried out by Hansa 2.0.
In the worst case scenario, it leads to the institutionalization of two-speed Europe. Here, the Hansa 2.0 approach defines one highly integrated camp where Southern Mediterranean Europe is behind.
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Such differences between Germany and France raise the possibilities of two-speed Europe, defined by varying degrees of liberal democracy, the possibility of debt-raising innovation, and mutual nuclear deterrence. The chance to prevent this is in large package deals. In other words, the two largest member states of the EU must overcome their biggest European dissatisfaction. If Germany embraced debt reciprocating for innovation, then some German conservatives fought, but that France might Europeanize its nuclear power. However, history shows that both events are unlikely.
Hansa 2.0. This includes the Balticaceae, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Scandinavia. It seems they are approaching instead. Friedrich Merz’s conservative German Prime Minister could become a major accelerator.
The European Council of Foreign Relations does not take a collective position. ECFR Publications represent only the views of individual authors.
