Last updated:February 13th, 2025, 17:35 IST
Pakistan clings to the fantasy of reconciliation, but Bangladesh has made its need for it. The two countries may coexist, but their paths remain irreversibly divided
A photograph of an Indian tank was taken in December 1971 during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. This war between East Pakistan and India with West Pakistan led to East Pakistan’s withdrawal and became an independent state of Bangladesh. (Photo by Punjab Press/AFP)
More than 50 years after the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war, the ghosts of the conflict remain largely looming over Bangladesh-Pakistan relations. The war was not merely a separatist struggle, but a bloody battle for survival, born of decades of economic exploitation and political conquest by West Pakistan.
When the Pakistani army launched Operation Searchlight on March 25, 1971, it marked the beginning of one of the most brutal crackdowns in modern history. The scale of the violence that followed was incredible. A generation that has been hurt by the massive amount of sexual violence and war, which has killed 300,000-3 million people, and the massive amount of sexual violence inflicted on Bengali women. Although Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state, the events of 1971 cemented enduring hostility towards Pakistan.
More than 50 years later, the reconciliation remains elusive not only because of past atrocities, but also as Pakistan continues to seek to acknowledge its role in one of the darkest chapters of South Asian history.
That despite the occasional diplomatic overtures, both countries are fundamentally, economically, ideologically drifting, and the idea of reconciliation remains mirage rather than a real possibility. is strengthening. Even with the recent change of government in Bangladesh and the formation of a provisional government under Muhammad Yunus, the change in political tone remains superficial and a deeper history that continues to form the relationship between Dhaka and Islamabad and strategic fractures cannot be negated.
Unfinished calculations and political disparities
The war crimes of 1971 are not far-reaching history for Bangladesh. They remain central to that national consciousness. Though successive Dhaka governments have sought formal apology from Pakistan, Islamabad repeatedly avoids direct recognition of negligence, offering only vague expressions of “remorse.” An era of diplomatic splendor.
Bangladesh’s 2013 War Crimes Court tried to bring those who worked with the Pakistani army to trial, but Pakistan condemned the trial and strengthened its belief that Islamabad still sympathizes with the anti-living elements within Bangladesh I did.
This historic tension goes beyond diplomacy and affects modern political and security concerns. Recall of retaliation between Pakistani diplomat Ferena Arshad, who is allegedly funding Bangladeshi Islamic extremism, and Bangladeshi diplomat Moomi Rahman from Islamabad, has led Pakistan to continue to nurture Bangladeshi’s Islamic network. It emphasizes that there is. These concerns have not disappeared in the Bangladeshi regime transition. Surprisingly, they remain embedded in the state’s security priorities.
Some secret ties persist within Bangladeshi military and bureaucracy, but primarily due to historic military connections before 1971, they were limited to sharing intelligence and diplomatic engagement. It remains. However, these interactions are increasingly hidden by Bangladesh’s increasing consistency with China, ASEAN and India up until recently, reducing its relevance in Pakistan’s strategic calculations.
Dhaka’s political stance could temper rhetoric under the interim government, but its security and foreign policy framework remains largely unchanged, preventing meaningful thawing of relations.
Pakistan’s attempts to revive engagement under the banner of Islamic solidarity have been largely unsuccessful as Bangladesh embraced a secular identity that was opposed to political Islam that ruled Pakistan’s rule. Even within regional politics in South Asia, Bangladesh has shown indifference to Pakistan and has made it clear that he is reluctant to revive the SAARC Summit in the past. The move shows a decline in the importance of Islamabad in regional diplomacy.
Bangladesh’s recent government shift saw tentative discussions in December 2024, eager to Pakistan to capitalize on the change in leadership. However, these efforts have run through without any substantial changes to Dhaka’s foreign policy priorities.
Bangladesh Rising, Pakistan Stagnation
The economic trajectory of Bangladesh and Pakistan has been following radically different paths since 1971. Dismissed as a “basket incident” by Bangladesh’s Henry Kissinger, Bangladesh built a booming $400 billion economy in the textile industry, increasing infrastructure expansion, and increasing foreign foreign countries. Per capita income, GDP growth rate and social indicators all exceed Pakistan’s, making them the economic success story of the region.
In contrast, Pakistan remains economically vulnerable and is burdened by political instability, IMF relief for recurring, and declining industrial productivity. Bilateral trade between the two countries remains unimportant, with Bangladesh’s focus firmly shifting to India, China and Southeast Asia.
Pakistan’s economic stagnation further weakened the settlement lawsuit, as Bangladesh’s regional ambitions are no longer tied to its previous enemy. The December 2024 SAARC revival attempt, partly due to Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach, saw little traction.
Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of using religion as a united force in diplomatic relations has also failed to gain traction in Bangladesh. Although both countries share the identity of a majority of Muslims, their approach to governance and statecraft is very different. Although Bangladesh maintains a secular political structure, Pakistan’s political landscape is dominated by religious nationalism and military influence. This ideological difference reinforces the reason Bangladesh does not consider Pakistan as a natural partner despite the sustained overture of Pakistan’s invocation of Islamic solidarity in Pakistan.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s diplomatic focus has shifted to China and the Gulf states, while Bangladesh’s foreign policy is concentrated on regional economic integration. The balance of power change in South Asia highlights why Pakistan is no longer relevant to Bangladesh’s long-term strategic interests.
Changes in the regime will inspire rough consequences
The recent transition of power in Bangladesh and the establishment of a provisional government under Muhammad Yunus have generated speculations regarding possible changes in foreign policy dynamics, particularly regarding Pakistan. The government has taken a more measured diplomatic stance, but early signs suggest that core strategic interests will not change.
Pakistan saw leadership transition as an opportunity to drive new involvement, particularly within the SAARC. However, attempts to revive regional diplomatic engagement in December 2024 did not lead to a critical policy restructuring. Bangladesh continues to prioritize economic pragmatism over symbolic diplomacy, and the short-term softening of rhetoric has not led to fundamental changes in relations. Historical and geopolitical fractures are too deep for a regime change to bridge them.
The current regime may be involved diplomatically for optics, but it rarely overrides Bangladesh’s deeply entrenched skepticism about Pakistan. The structural foundations of Bangladesh’s strategic independence, economic rise and security calculations remain firmly intact, ensuring that relationships do not evolve beyond surface level diplomacy.
Why is true reconciliation an illusion?
Without a formal recognition of Pakistan’s war crimes, a true reconciliation remains impossible. Diplomatic interactions last, but they do not reflect true trust or partnerships, but the need for international diplomacy. Can the relationship be improved? Perhaps, however, only if Pakistan undergoes radical change will include a formal apology in 1971, a halt of historical interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, and a reassessment of regional diplomatic priorities.
Given the internal instability and economic decline in Pakistan, such transformation remains unlikely. In contrast, Bangladesh is moving forward with confidence, ensuring that Pakistan’s future role is kept to a minimum.
The ghost of 1971 is more than just a memory. They continue to define the political landscape of South Asia. Pakistan clings to the fantasy of reconciliation, but Bangladesh has made its need for it. The two countries may coexist, but their paths remain irreversibly divided.
The author is the Department of Veterans and Auxiliary Research (Strategy and Security Research) of the Indian Navy, Naval War College, Goa. The views expressed in the above works are personal and are solely by the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
